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INTRODUCTION

The modern First Amendment law of commercial speech (that is,
commercial advertising) displays an internal contradiction. Advertising
regulation falls into two categories: (1) regulation on the ground that the
speech is false or misleading and (2) everything else. When government
seeks to regulate commercial advertising on the ground that it is false or
misleading, the law gives it broad freedom of action and the power to
regulate in ways—and for reasons—that would never pass muster in the
political arena.1 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has been
*
Professor of Law, Wayne State University. I’m grateful to Jessica Litman; my
colleagues on the ACLU’s Committee on Corporate Personhood and Constitutional
Protections, including Roslyn Litman, Frank Askin, Caitlin Borgmann, David Cruz, and Ellen
Feingold; the organizers of and participants in the American Antitrust Institute’s 2012
Conference on Harmonizing Civil Liberties and Antitrust Policy, including Bert Foer, the
Hon. Douglas Ginsburg, and Christopher Sagers; and my colleagues Bob Ackerman, Laura
Bartell, Lance Gable, Chris Lund, David Moss, and Steven Winter. Neither the ACLU nor
the AAI, nor any of the people listed here, bear any responsibility for my errors or
idiosyncratic views.
1. See infra Part III.
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moving ever more strongly to the posture that governments may not
restrict advertising on any ground other than that it is false or
misleading; when it seeks to do so, it is subject to the same restrictions
that apply when it seeks to regulate political speech.2 But the Court has
never adequately justified this distinction, and it does not look easily
justifiable.3
In this Article I suggest that we can better understand the divide in
modern commercial speech law by looking to a larger issue: the law’s
treatment of speech by for-profit corporations. In general, the Court
has told us, corporate speech is entitled to the same protection as that
uttered by individuals.4 The Supreme Court cases initially articulating
that rule are contemporaneous with, and share reasoning in common
with, the ones initially disapproving regulation of commercial speech.5
Both sets of cases stress the informational value of the speech in
question, so that for the government to restrict the speech would
deprive us all of the information and views it conveys.6 Both express
concern about the power of government through selective regulation to
skew the marketplace of ideas.7
At the same time, the First Amendment law of corporate speech
betrays a countertheme: the concern, manifested in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce,8 that unrestrained corporate speech can skew
and distort the marketplace of ideas. That theme runs parallel to the
commercial-speech concern that misleading advertising can lead
consumers astray in ways that the marketplace of ideas will not be able
to counteract. In both contexts, the law approves government actions
that some might consider paternalistic in order to protect an adequately
functioning speech marketplace.
In the context of corporate speech, the Austin concern for
“distortion” or skew9 ended up gaining little traction, and for good
reason.10 Taken to its logical extreme, it might support an argument that
corporate speech should have no First Amendment protection
whatsoever. But it’s hard to make that argument work. In thinking
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Parts II, IV.B.
See infra Parts II, IV.B.
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Id.
See infra Part IV.B.
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about the informational value of for-profit corporations’ speech, there’s
no good way of drawing the line between those corporate media entities
whose speech we value for the benefits it brings the rest of us and those
corporate entities whose speech we might seek to restrain as distorting
the marketplace of ideas. And a legislative rule seeking to restrict
corporate speech so as to minimize distortion, outside of the specialized
context of candidate elections, would have to be hugely sweeping if it
were to be meaningful at all. The resulting political system would not be
one we would recognize.
In the commercial-speech context, by contrast, the obstacles to
regulation are not so unmanageable; we can construct a limited domain
that acknowledges the truth that the marketplace of ideas does not
always function as advertised. It is not plain, though, that that domain
should be limited to the category of false or misleading speech. On the
contrary, there is a good argument that when it comes to regulation of
true, nonmisleading commercial speech as well the courts should apply a
standard of scrutiny more forgiving than that applied to regulation of
speech generally.
In Parts II and III, I will examine the contradiction between the
ordinary First Amendment law of (nonmisleading) commercial
advertising and the law relating to misleading or confusing advertising
and trademarks. In Part IV, I will explore a contradiction within the law
of political speech by corporations. In Part V, I will argue that the rifts
within both the law of commercial speech and that of corporate speech
are parallel, deeply rooted, and reflect a fundamental dichotomy within
American jurisprudence. In Part VI, I will return to the law of
corporate speech, and in Part VII, I will build on those insights to
suggest that the Supreme Court has taken the law of commercial speech
in the wrong direction.
II. THE ROAD TO SORRELL
U.S. constitutional law before 1975 saw commercial advertising as
falling wholly outside the First Amendment. Advertising was the
“promot[ion] or [pursuit of] a gainful occupation” and not speech at
all.11 When the Court found itself divided over a state’s ban on door-todoor magazine selling, the Justices agreed that “of course” a seller of
“gadgets or brushes” or “pots” could raise no First Amendment claim—

11. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). The Court in Chrestensen upheld
an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of advertising handbills in the streets. Id. at 55.
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he was engaging in commercial activity, not speech.12 The Justices
followed that understanding in the Capital Broadcasting case, summarily
affirming a ruling upholding Congress’ prohibition of cigarette
advertising in broadcast media.13 That view of commercial advertising
contributed as well to the Court’s ruling in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, upholding an ordinance
forbidding newspapers from organizing employment ads into sexsegregated categories.14
Things began to change, though, in the 1975 case of Bigelow v.
Virginia.15 This case, decided a couple of years after Roe v. Wade,16
concerned a state statute making it illegal to “encourage or prompt the
procuring of abortion.”17 The State of Virginia had criminally charged
an alternative weekly publisher for running an ad beginning
“UNWANTED PREGNANCY LET US HELP YOU—Abortions are
now legal in New York” and offering, for a fee, to place women with
New York hospitals and clinics performing abortions.18 The Court
treated the speech as protected; while it was commercial advertising
related to the marketplace of products and services, the Court found
that its contribution to the marketplace of ideas outweighed Virginia’s
interest in suppressing information about a constitutionally protected
service legally offered in another state.19
The big doctrinal shift came the following year: in Virginia Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court
considered a statute banning pharmacists from advertising their prices
for prescription drugs.20 Ruling law indicated that Virginia’s ban should
be treated as a regulation of commercial transactions, with no further
significance—but the Court disagreed.21 This was a First Amendment
case, Justice Blackmun explained, in part because drug price
information was important to consumers and vital to the well-being of
the poor, sick, and aged, and in part because “the free flow of
12. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641 (1951); id. at 650 n.* (Black, J., dissenting).
13. Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 583–84 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d mem.,
Capital Broad. Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
14. 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973).
15. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812–13 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960)).
18. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 191 S.E.2d 173, 174 (Va. 1972), rev’d, 421 U.S. 809
(1975).
19. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818–29.
20. 425 U.S. 748, 749–50 (1976) (quoting VA. CODE. ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974)).
21. Id. at 758–70.
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commercial information is indispensable” if resources are to be properly
allocated in our economy.22 Economic theory, after all, predicts that
market allocation will be inefficient if not driven by informed consumer
decisions.23
It’s worth noting how odd those arguments were from a First
Amendment perspective. That a ban on drug price advertising will
cause the elderly to pay too much for drugs is an important policy
argument, but the desirability of inexpensive drugs for the elderly seems
like a matter for legislators to weigh; it’s not a First Amendment goal
trumping the collective decision-making process.24 Whatever values are
understood to underlie speech’s privileged constitutional status—
whether they relate to self-government, the communicative participation
necessary for democratic legitimacy, the search for truth, or individual
self-realization—those values don’t include the availability of cheap
medications or consumer products.25 And it’s hard to argue that
widespread dissemination of price information is constitutionally
mandated by virtue of its value in promoting efficient market allocation
given that the Constitution doesn’t mandate that any particular sector of
the economy utilize market allocation at all, efficient or otherwise.26 It
leaves these issues as policy questions for the policy process.27
The Virginia Board opinion, though, also phrased its concerns in a
way more in line with traditional First Amendment thinking. Justice
Blackmun stressed the difficulty of drawing lines adequately
distinguishing advertising from other speech, and he suggested that
commercial advertising might contain information relevant to political
debate (if only the question of how the state should regulate the activity
being advertised).28 Government, in blocking that information, was
keeping information from the citizenry using an explicitly content-based
mechanism.29 That was censorship of information in the public sphere—
no matter that it was merely information about product pricing—and it

22. Id. at 762–65.
23. Id. at 765.
24. See Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1979).
25. Id. at 7–25.
26. See id. at 32.
27. See id. at 34. But see Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 480
(1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that advertising is “an essential ingredient of the
[economic] competition that our public law promotes” is part of its First Amendment value).
28. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764–65.
29. Id. at 770–71.
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therefore implicated the First Amendment.30 “[P]eople will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them.”31
The Court in Virginia Board emphasized that government could still
ban advertising that contained false statements, or statements that were
not provably false but were nonetheless deceptive or misleading.32
Returning to the metaphor of the free flow of commercial information,
Justice Blackmun said the state had the right to ensure that the
“stream . . . flow[s] cleanly.”33 Commercial advertising, he suggested,
might be more easily verifiable by its distributor than other speech and
was less likely to be chilled.34 Accordingly, it was “less necessary to
tolerate inaccurate statements” in this arena.35 At the same time, he
stressed, the state could not achieve its commercial goals through the
mechanism of keeping people in ignorance.36 In particular, it could not
“completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful
information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.”37
That condemnation of regulators “suppress[ing] . . . truthful
information”38 seemed clear-cut, but in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission39 five years later, the Court took an
ambiguous step back. The case involved a New York rule banning
advertising by electric utilities promoting the use of electricity on the
theory that New Yorkers would be better off if they weren’t motivated
to consume quite so much electricity.40 The Court didn’t seem to have a
problem with the state’s larger approach. It explained that in contrast to
the usual First Amendment rule—that government can regulate speech
on content-based grounds only in exceptional cases where strictly
necessary to vindicate a “compelling” state interest—content-based
30. Id. at 770.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 770–73.
33. Id. at 771–72.
34. Id. at 772 n.24.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 770.
37. Id. at 773. The Court distinguished Capital Broadcasting as involving “the special
problems of the electronic broadcast media.” Id.
38. Id. at 772 n.24.
39. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
40. Id. at 558–60 (citing STATE OF N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, STATEMENT OF POLICY
ON ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1977)).
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regulation of advertising was fine so long as it satisfied a less demanding
test that the rule directly advanced some “substantial” interest and was
no broader than it needed to be.41
The Court offered no explanation for why it selected that standard
of scrutiny, and it offered no case law support.42 It declined to rely on
either Capital Broadcasting or Pittsburgh Press.43 To the contrary, it
noted that “in recent years, this Court has not approved a blanket ban
on commercial speech unless the expression itself was flawed in some
way, either because it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.”44
The Court’s willingness to adopt a less demanding test seems to have
been driven by its general sense that commercial speech was simply “of
less constitutional moment than other forms of speech.”45
In the end, the Court struck down the New York statute: it found
that the law banned the advertising of energy-efficient products and
services that would actually promote energy savings and, consequently,
was too broad.46 Its willingness to scrutinize the law closely,47 and a
footnote indicating that courts should “review with special care
regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue
a nonspeech-related policy,”48 suggested some discomfort with the
state’s mode of regulation. Nonetheless, the Court’s announced test,
and the structure of its opinion, indicated that it was willing to approve
state attempts to influence consumers’ behavior by limiting the
advertising they received.49
41. Id. at 564.
42. It did cite its decision three years earlier in Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), which it characterized, expansively, as holding open the
possibility that the state might impose carefully drawn restrictions on contraceptive
advertising for reasons such as minimizing offensiveness and protecting children. See Cent.
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565–66.
43. The Court did not mention Capital Broadcasting at all, and it distinguished
Pittsburgh Press as involving “speech related to illegal activity.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
564. In so doing, it followed Virginia Board, which characterized Pittsburgh Press as a case
where “the transactions proposed in the forbidden advertisements are themselves illegal.”
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772. That was a stretch, though. See infra notes 456–
62 and accompanying text.
44. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9; see also supra note 43.
45. Id. at 562 n.5.
46. Id. at 569–71.
47. See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court Term, 1979—Foreword: Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34–36 (1980).
48. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
49. Justices Blackmun’s separate opinion noted this view and expressly declined to
endorse it. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573–74 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[E]nergy
conservation is a goal of paramount national and local importance. I disagree with the Court,
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A year later, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, the plurality
emphasized the “subordinate position” and “lesser protection” of
commercial speech.50 It stated that it was within a city’s power to ban all
commercial advertising via billboard, notwithstanding the Justices’
doubts whether a similar ban would be constitutional for
noncommercial messages,51 and it held that government could draw
content-based lines between different advertising messages given mere
rational basis in a way that would be impermissible for noncommercial
speech.52
The Court’s willingness to approve commercial speech regulation
reached a high point in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Co.53 The legislature in that case had restricted the advertising of casino
gambling to Puerto Rico residents by virtue of its view that advertising
would cause residents to gamble more and
[e]xcessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would
produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare
of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and
cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of
prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration
of organized crime.54
The Court upheld the law.55
But later on, the ground shifted again. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, the Court struck down a Rhode Island law banning the
price advertising of alcoholic beverages.56 Although the majority could
not unite behind a single holding, four of the Justices took a firm stand
against the constitutionality of any law restricting the dissemination of
however, when it says that suppression of speech may be a permissible means to achieve that
goal.”).
50. 453 U.S. 490, 506–07 (1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63).
51. See id. at 503–17.
52. See id.
53. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
54. Id. at 330, 341 (quoting Brief for Appellees’ at 37, Posadas, 478 U.S. 328 (No. 841903)).
55. Id. at 348; see also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (upholding
a ban on direct-mail solicitation of personal injury victims for thirty days following an
accident on the grounds that such solicitations invade victims’ privacy and tranquility and
reflect poorly on the profession); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421, 436
(1993) (upholding a federal law allowing the advertisement of state-run lotteries only in
publications published in, or broadcasters licensed to, the relevant state).
56. 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
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advertising messages unless the messages were false, misleading, or
presented the risk of coercion or undue influence.57 Three of the four
urged that strict scrutiny was appropriate because such government
rules are paternalistic: “The First Amendment directs us to be especially
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good.”58 One of the four would
have dispensed with strict scrutiny, holding such rules unconstitutional
per se.59 Four other Justices saw no need to go so far but indicated that
government cannot ban advertising when it can achieve its goals more
directly by regulating purchases of the advertised product.60
The Court vacillated in the years that followed. In Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, considering a federal ban
on broadcast casino-gambling advertising that could be received in
states without casinos, seven or eight Justices seemed to view as
legitimate the states’ interests in ameliorating the costs of casino
gambling by prohibiting advertising, and thus limiting demand.61 But a
five-Justice majority rejected that approach in Thompson v. Western
States Medical Center.62 There, the Court considered federal law
governing compounding pharmacies (that is, pharmacies that prepare
customized medications not available from pharmaceutical companies,
for example, by preparing a medication in a nonstandard dosage or in
liquid rather than pill form).63 The law exempted compounding
pharmacies from Food and Drug Administration (FDA) “new drug”
regulation (which would have required them to prove the safety and
efficacy of their formulations through clinical trials) but imposed
57. See id. at 501–04 (plurality opinion); id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment).
58. Id. at 503 (plurality opinion).
59. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
60. Id. at 530–31 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). This approach, also
visible in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995), has been described as
“replicat[ing] strict scrutiny without saying so.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits,
Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 S. CT. REV. 123, 145.
The ninth Justice was Justice Scalia. His opinion suggested that First Amendment
protection of commercial speech was questionable given the national consensus in favor of
advertising regulation at the times the First and Fourteenth Amendments were enacted. 44
Liquormart, 514 U.S. at 517–18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
61. 527 U.S. 173, 189 (1999). The interest, put another way, was one in avoiding
situations where citizens of noncasino states would “hear [the speech] and make rash or costly
decisions.” Id. at 194. The Court struck down the law as inadequately tailored to the goals it
sought to advance. Id. at 195–96.
62. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
63. Id. at 360–61.
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restrictions including a ban on promoting or advertising the
compounding of particular drugs.64
The Court held the statute unconstitutional.65 Four dissenting
Justices urged that the absence of FDA-required testing made
compounding pharmacy products more risky than other drugs,66 and
they saw the statute as well tailored to the goal of avoiding advertisingdriven demand for compounding-pharmacy products on the part of
patients whose needs could be otherwise served.67 There was no need
for demanding scrutiny, they urged.68 Advertising restrictions “do not
often repress individual self-expression; they rarely interfere with the
functioning of democratic political processes; and they often reflect a
democratically determined governmental decision to regulate a
commercial venture in order to protect, for example, the consumer, the
public health, individual safety, or the environment.”69 For the majority,
though, the dissenters’ argument was flawed at the root: it was no more
than the “fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful
information.”70
Finally, five years ago, the Court decided Sorrell v. IMS Health,
Inc.71 Sorrell involved a Vermont restriction on the use, for marketing
purposes and without a doctor’s permission, of pharmacy-collected lists
of the drugs each doctor prescribed.72 Drug companies were using that
information to tailor their one-on-one marketing pitches to doctors, and
the Vermont legislature felt that those tailored pitches were sufficiently
effective as to cause doctors to overprescribe expensive brand-name
drugs and underprescribe generics.73 Without that detailed information,
when it came time for pharmaceutical representatives to make their
sales pitches and offer the doctors free drug samples (over $11 billion
worth industry-wide every year74), along with “gifts, free meals, and

64. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
111 Stat. 2296, 2328–30 (initially (but no longer) codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353a (Supp. 1997)).
65. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377.
66. See id. at 382–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 379.
68. Id. at 387–89.
69. Id. at 388.
70. Id. at 374 (majority opinion).
71. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
72. Id. at 2659.
73. Id. at 2661.
74. IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d, 550 F.3d
42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 936 (2009).
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other inducements,”75 the legislature concluded, doctors would find the
industry’s pitches for expensive proprietary drugs less appealing.76
The Supreme Court approached the case as a restriction on
commercial speech and, by a 6–3 majority, struck down the law.77 The
majority mentioned Central Hudson only once.78 The fact that the law
singled out for regulation the use of certain information in connection
with for-profit advertising, while leaving untouched its use in connection
with other speech, the Court said, mandated strict scrutiny.79 The fact
that the restriction intended to “suppress” the advertisers’ message that
doctors should prescribe their brand-name products made it
impermissible without more.80 Narrow tailoring was irrelevant because
the state’s concerns about drug-company marketing were “incompatible
with the First Amendment.”81
It’s fair to say, I think, that Central Hudson is no longer good law.
The Sorrell Court purported to follow Central Hudson, but it turned it
on its head: it described that case as standing for the proposition that
government, in regulating advertising, may not “seek to suppress a
disfavored message.”82 According to the Sorrell Court, a law that
regulates advertising—although not other speech—should by virtue of
that fact alone be deemed both content- and speaker-based and,
therefore, subject to heightened scrutiny.83 All the more, when
government restricts advertising because it disfavors a particular
commercial message (as it did in Central Hudson), it violates the general
rule forbidding government to regulate speech “because of
disagreement with the message it conveys”—a rule for which
“[c]ommercial speech is no exception.”84 Thus, after Sorrell, there is no
room left in the law for Central Hudson’s view that—in principle—the

75. Id. at 168.
76. See id. at 171–73.
77. The dissenters (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan) disagreed that this was a
commercial speech matter; they urged that the state was only restricting the use of
information gathered pursuant to regulatory mandate and not implicating the First
Amendment at all. To the extent that there was a commercial speech restriction here, they
continued, it satisfied the Central Hudson test. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
78. Id. at 2668 (majority opinion).
79. Id. at 2663–64.
80. See id. at 2667–72.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2668.
83. See id. at 2663–64, 2667.
84. Id. at 2664 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).

570

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[99:559

state has the power to limit an industry’s advertising on the theory that
more extensive advertising would lead to greater consumption of a
disfavored product.85
Now, state regulation disfavoring a particular advertising message
does not necessarily constitute “paternalism” as that term is usually
understood.86 When New York in Central Hudson banned utilities from
running ads promoting electricity use, it didn’t do so because it believed
that people would respond to the ads by doing something personally
destructive or against their own interests; rather, it believed that
increased electricity consumption might be in individuals’ own interests
but not in those of society as a whole.87 In Virginia Board, similarly, the
concern was not that price information would lead consumers to make
ill-advised choices but that the pressures of price competition would
lead pharmacists to act as merchants rather than professionals.88
Both of these were instances of classic regulation, seeking to achieve
a public good by lessening the incidence of self-interested private action.
When the Court has struck down commercial speech regulation, indeed,
it has almost always been because the government sought by the speech
restriction to discourage persons from doing things that were in fact in
their individual self-interest (though not, it was thought, in the interest
of society as a whole). Whatever that is, it isn’t paternalism.89
Nevertheless, cases like Bigelow, Virginia Board, and 44 Liquormart
demonstrate the appeal of the argument that government regulation of
commercial speech constitutes impermissible censorship burdening the
thinking process of the public. The idea that government should not be
85. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 162–64 (2d Cir. 2012). See generally
Hunter B. Thomson, Note, Whither Central Hudson? Commercial Speech in the Wake of
Sorrell v. IMS Health, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 171 (2013). But see, e.g., Hart v.
Electronic Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769–70 (D.N.J. 2011) (“Sorrell did not explicitly
overrule Central Hudson . . . .” (emphasis added)).
86. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1237 (1988).
87. See id. at 1241.
88. See id. at 1238; see also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 484–89 (1985) (discussing Central Hudson). Indeed,
when Rhode Island in 44 Liquormart banned liquor price advertising, its primary concern was
not that people would learn about low liquor prices and be inspired to drink more than was
good for them. It was that price advertising would lead liquor stores to compete on price
grounds and sell their product more cheaply—again, something in the stores’ own interests
but something the legislature deemed to be contrary to those of society as a whole. See 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 7–9 (1st Cir. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
89. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1, 43–44, 50–53 (2000). On paternalism, see generally Bill New, Paternalism and Public
Policy, 15 ECON. & PHIL. 63 (1999).
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seeking to manipulate individual action by limiting the information
available to people—whether paternalistically or not—strikes a deep
First Amendment chord. Justice Stevens once put it this way:
Any “interest” in restricting the flow of accurate information
because of the perceived danger of that knowledge is anathema
to the First Amendment; more speech and a better informed
citizenry are among the central goals of the Free Speech Clause.
Accordingly, the Constitution is most skeptical of supposed state
interests that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government believes to be their own good.90
First Amendment lawyers’ alarm bells typically go off the most
loudly whenever the fact that somebody might be informed or
convinced by speech is offered as a reason for regulating it.91 And that,
after all, was the fact pattern of many of the commercial speech cases,
including Central Hudson. A First Amendment philosophy premised on
the belief that government cannot be trusted to decide what arguments
citizens should be exposed to, and what they should be allowed to know,
will reject this sort of commercial speech regulation—without regard to
whether the advertising’s subject matter is of core First Amendment
concern and without regard to the identity of the speakers.92
III. THE CHALLENGE OF DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
At the same time the Court was articulating this libertarian
understanding of commercial speech law, though, it maintained its
90. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
91. See, e.g., Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 688–89
(1959) (“New York has . . . prevent[ed] the exhibition of a motion picture because that
picture advocates an idea . . . . Yet the First Amendment’s basic guarantee is of freedom to
advocate ideas. . . . [I]t protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is
unconvincing.”); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 334 (1991) (“The government may not suppress speech on the ground
that it is too persuasive.”).
92. Kathleen Sullivan points out that this approach, identifying as the most pernicious
threats to free speech government “paternalistic protection of listeners” and government
restrictions on private actors’ use of their own resources for speech, reflects a particular
understanding of the First Amendment. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court Term,
2009—Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 155–63 (2010). She
contrasts that approach, which she calls free-speech-as-liberty, with the competing one she
calls free-speech-as-equality. Id. at 163–66. The latter—at least as well-rooted in the case
law—instead stresses government’s obligation to protect dissenters and to open public
resources for speech by rich and poor alike. See id. at 146–55; see also Victoria Baranetsky,
Note, The Economic-Liberty Approach of the First Amendment: A Story of American
Booksellers v. Hudnut, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 171, 176–79 (2012). That dichotomy
can be seen to parallel the one introduced infra Part V.
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support for government regulation of false and misleading advertising—
something more problematic from a traditional First Amendment
standpoint than is generally realized. Let’s look at a few examples of
advertising law as it is practiced.
When Johnson & Johnson decided to name an antacid product
“Mylanta Night Time Strength,” the Third Circuit said no.93 The
product’s effects, the court noted, did not last all night—and surveys
showed that the name had led a minority of consumers to believe that it
would.94 When Tropicana sought to advertise its orange juice as “pure,
pasteurized juice as it comes from the orange,” using an image of an
Olympic athlete squeezing an orange into a Tropicana carton, the
Second Circuit said no.95 The court found the slogan misleading because
the juice was—as explicitly stated—pasteurized, and thus not “as it
comes from the orange.”96 Notwithstanding that any claim of literal
falsity would have been dubious, the court noted based on survey results
that “a not insubstantial number of consumers were clearly misled.”97
When General Motors (GM) advertised a car at the NCAA men’s
basketball tournament by first pointing out that Lew Alcindor (by then
known as Kareem Abdul-Jabbar) had been three times voted MVP at
that tournament and then stating that the Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight had
been three times named to the Consumers Digest Best Buy list, the
Ninth Circuit saw a sufficient possibility of consumer confusion as to
leave it to a jury whether GM should have to pay damages to AbdulJabbar.98 Again, there was plainly no literal falsity; but the context, the
court felt, could cause the viewer to infer an endorsement that AbdulJabbar had not made.99
These examples could be multiplied indefinitely. Not every false
advertising case ends in an injunction limiting speech based on a mere

93. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer Pharm.
Co., 290 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2002).
94. Id. at 590–95. The court also explained that the brand name implied that the
product had been “specially made to work at night,” notwithstanding that it was in fact
merely a more powerful version of the ordinary Mylanta product. Id. at 589.
95. Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 314 (2d Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 318.
97. Id. at 317. The court added as further support for its holding the fact that
Tropicana’s juice was sometimes frozen—not merely “squeezed, heated and packaged.” Id.
at 318.
98. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1996); see also White
v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399–1402 (9th Cir. 1992).
99. Adbul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 410–13.
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possibility of confusion.100 The key point to take away here, though, is
that conventional consumer protection law can lead to bans on speech
even in the absence of literal falsity, even where there is no direct
evidence that the speaker intended to mislead consumers, based on
after-the-fact conclusions drawn from the survey-measured experience
of actual consumers, and without regard to the fact that most of those
consumers were not misled at all.101
Sometimes disputes over the legality of advertising require courts to
make challenging determinations—is it misleading for a company to
describe its vegan (eggless) condiment as “Just Mayo”?102 In order to
give consumers a predictable framework in which to buy consumer
products, government regulation proscribes statements that—absent the
regulatory action—could not reliably be considered misleading at all.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) thus has promulgated a
complex definition of what it means for a food to be “organic”; the
definition incorporates such components as a list of approved nonorganic ingredients that the agency deems to be without reasonably

100. See, e.g., Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 57 (2014).
101. In Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories, 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000),
amended on rehearing by 209 F.3d 1032, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000), Judge Easterbrook
took the position that a false-advertising claim should not lie simply because a substantial
number of consumers misunderstood a statement that was straightforwardly correct, given
the dictionary meanings of its constituent words. Mead Johnson, 209 F.3d at 1034. A
statement, he argued, does not “impl[y] something that is false” merely because consumers
misunderstand it. Id. But this is not the majority view; indeed, it is “fundamentally at odds
with the accepted uses of extrinsic state of mind evidence of deception in advertising cases.”
Richard J. Leighton, Making Puffery Determinations in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases:
Surveys, Dictionaries, Judicial Edicts and Materiality Tests, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 615, 628
(2005). Rather, notwithstanding that an advertising statement may be “literally true and
grammatically correct,” the question of deception turns on “what does the person to whom
the advertisement is addressed find to be the message?” Am. Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co, 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See generally Shari Seidman Diamond
& David J. Franklyn, Trademark Surveys: An Undulating Path, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2029 (2014);
Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449
(2012).
102. See Stephanie Strom, F.D.A. Allows Maker of Just Mayo to Keep Product’s Name,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2015, at B2, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/business/fda-allowsmaker-of-just-mayo-to-keep-products-name.html [https://perma.cc/CTV8-BJZ9]. Similarly, is
it misleading for a company to refer to seaweed-based carageenan as “gelatin”? Does it
matter that ordinary consumers (surveys reveal) don’t know how “gelatin” conventionally is
made and thus arguably cannot be confused by the characterization? See Rebecca Tushnet, It
Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 236 (2007) (discussing Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Del
Monte Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
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available organic substitutes.103 That list, and other elements of the
definition, involves contested policy choices.104 The law treats it as
uncontroversial that the government can rely on those choices to set its
own definition of what it means to be “organic” and bar as “misleading”
any alternative uses of the word.
The FDA has taken the position that it may be misleading—and
therefore unprotected by the First Amendment—for a milk producer to
(accurately) label its milk as “from cows not treated with rbST.”105
Without “proper context,” the agency has explained, such statements
may misleadingly imply that milk from untreated cows is safer or better
than milk from treated cows.106 The agency therefore recommends that
any such statement be accompanied by statements such as a disclaimer
that “[n]o significant difference has been shown between milk derived
from rbST-treated and non-rbST-treated cows.”107
This is not how things work in the world of ordinary speech. The
first notable point here is the irrelevance of intent in advertising
regulation.108 There is no scienter requirement under the federal
Lanham Act that governs false advertising and trademark claims, nor is
there under state consumer protection statutes.109 Similarly, suits for
defamation and commercial disparagement are not subjected to the
Sullivan or Gertz standards if the offending statements are deemed to be
commercial speech.110
The First Amendment, though, ordinarily disfavors regimes under
which “an honest speaker[] . . . may accidentally incur liability for
103. Tushnet, supra note 102, at 241 (citing 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.300 to .301 (2007)).
104. See id.
105. Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from
Cows That Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg.
6279, 6280 (Feb. 17, 1994).
106. Id.
107. Id. In International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 648 (6th Cir.
2010), the Sixth Circuit struck down an Ohio law prohibiting compositional claims including
“from cows not treated with rbST.” It upheld the power of the state, however, to require
disclaimers such as the one suggested by the FDA. Id. at 650.
108. Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial Speech
Doctrine, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 294, 308 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
109. See id.
110. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 928 (3d Cir. 1990). Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974), ruled that a state cannot impose defamation
liability for a statement the defendant reasonably believed to be true. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), held that a state cannot impose liability for defamation
of a public official or a public figure except in cases where the speaker knew that his
statements were false or acted in reckless disregard of whether they were false.
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speaking.”111 Even literally false and socially harmful statements will
often be protected if uttered innocently—as the Court explained in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, that protection is part of the “breathing
space” that freedom of expression needs in order to survive.112 The
Constitution forbids the state to sanction political candidates, even for
plain falsehoods, if they are made in good faith.113 When it comes to
subversive advocacy, speech is protected unless it is “intended, and
likely, to incite imminent lawless action.”114 In defamation or privacy
actions, the Court has stated, states cannot impose liability without mens
rea; the alternative would risk “serious impairment of the indispensable
service of a free press.”115 In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court saw
it as the sine qua non of constitutionality for a state cross-burning statute
that it require direct evidence of intent to intimidate.116
Ordinary First Amendment law, moreover, is hostile to any regime
in which it is difficult to predict whether speech will incur legal sanction.
Speech can be regulated only by “a precise statute ‘evincing a legislative
judgment that certain specific conduct be . . . proscribed.”117
Uncertainly-bounded prohibitions may “trap the innocent”;118
alternatively, the fear of liability will chill speakers from engaging in
speech that the legislature had not felt it necessary to prohibit, and that
indeed the legislature could not have prohibited even had it wanted
to.119

111. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment). Leslie Kendrick has suggested that the importance given to speakers’ intent is
connected to autonomy theories of free speech; that might mesh with the law’s deemphasizing intent in commercial speech regulation where autonomy-based theories do not
play a role. See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255,
1278–86 (2014).
112. 376 U.S. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
113. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61–62 (1982).
114. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
115. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
116. 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003). Similarly, in United States v. Elonis, No. 13-983, slip
op. at 13–17 (U.S. June 1, 2015), the Supreme Court relied on statutory interpretation to
reverse a lower court’s ruling that a speaker violates 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) simply by
transmitting in interstate commerce a statement that a reasonable person would see as a
threat to injure the person of another.
117. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 n.5 (1972) (quoting Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963)).
118. Id. at 108.
119. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (1989); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
1101, 1169 (1993).
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Contemporary regulation of misleading advertising, however, shows
little of this concern for predictability. One cannot say with any
assurance whether the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will find an
advertisement to contain a misleading claim.120 Examples of prohibited
speech, from the Tushnet & Goldman advertising law casebook, include
“[a]n ad portraying a broken, hard-to-find toy being replaced because
the toy had been purchased with a particular credit card, when the credit
card company did not replace broken goods but merely refunded the
purchase price”;121 “[a]dvertisements for a pain reliever that, in claiming
to have twice as much pain reliever as the leading analgesic, implied that
it had twice as much pain reliever as all commonly available pain
relievers”;122 and “[c]laims that Geritol would cure tiredness caused by
‘iron deficiency anemia,’ when most tired people have no such
deficiency.”123 None of these results can be derived mechanically.
First Amendment law does not typically decide whether speech is
protected by embarking on a post hoc inquiry about the actual effects of
a given message on segments of its target audience.124 In defamation
cases, the courts ask whether a “reasonable person” could understand a
statement as asserting a statement of verifiable fact, not whether actual
people in fact did.125 Yet as I noted earlier, suits by one competitor
against another for false advertising routinely are driven by survey
results126—how did consumers in fact respond to the advertisement in
question? That approach has the important benefit of zeroing in on
false advertising law’s core concern—are consumers being confused?—
but it does so by subordinating concerns about predictability that
dominate in ordinary First Amendment law.
Part of the challenge of false advertising law is that, in a world of
distracted and inattentive consumers, almost any statement may leave
some consumers with the wrong impression.127 The law, thus, does not
120. See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), in which the advertiser
unsuccessfully makes this argument, although not in a First Amendment context.
121. REBECCA TUSHNET & ERIC GOLDMAN, ADVERTISING & MARKETING LAW:
CASE AND MATERIALS 306 (2d ed. 2014).
122. Id. at 307.
123. Id.
124. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468–69 (2007) (plurality opinion);
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 803–04.
125. See, e.g., Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 861–63 (9th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1061 (1999).
126. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
127. See Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C.
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provide for liability if only a trivial number of consumers are confused.
Its threshold, rather, is confusion on the part of a “substantial number”
of consumers—a figure commonly set at 15%–20%.128 Thus, if an
advertiser states that its product cures tiredness caused by “iron
deficiency anemia” and as much as 15%–20% of its target audience
understand the statement, in context, to convey the false message that
the product will cure their own tiredness, then the statement may be
actionable under the Lanham Act. But that is not the approach of
conventional First Amendment thinking, which would see the fact that
80%–85% of consumers were not confused as an ironclad argument that
the speech was constitutionally protected.129
More fundamentally, it is a commonplace of ordinary First
Amendment law that government can regulate speech on the basis of its
content only in cases of extreme necessity—only where the interests the
government seeks to serve are compelling and the speech restriction is
the unavoidable, “actually necessary,” least restrictive means to
vindicate those interests.130 Regulation of blatantly false commercial
speech seems to satisfy that test.
But it is hardly “necessary” for the government to adopt elaborate
rules to prescribe, say, whether a beer can be labeled “organic” if made
with non-organic hops, and then to punish brewers who describe their
product in a way that diverges from the government’s judgments. It is, I
think, useful and indeed desirable for government to do so—absent
some definitional enterprise like the one the government has engaged
in, consumers would be hard-pressed in evaluating producer claims that
their products are organic and in using that criterion to choose among
different products.131 The USDA definition, while arbitrary, gives
consumers something to work with and producers a standard to live up
to. But it is not the only possible means the government could have
L. REV. 737, 743 (2007).
128. See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95
IOWA L. REV. 63, 98 n.127 (2009); see also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp.
2d 339, 345–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). But see Mobileye, Inc. v. Picitup Corp., 928 F. Supp. 2d 759, 777 (S.D.N.Y
2013) (9.2% is not “insubstantial as a matter of law”).
129. Daniel J. Gervais & Julia Latsko, Who Cares About the 85 Percent? Reconsidering
Survey Evidence of Online Confusion in Trademark Cases, 96 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 265, (2014) (urging that trademark law should not ignore the interests of non-confused
consumers).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548–51 (2012) (plurality
opinion).
131. For a more sophisticated discussion, see Tushnet, supra note 102, at 238–48.
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chosen to address this problem, and it would not pass a strict scrutiny
test.
Nor do other aspects of consumer protection law follow in ordinary
First Amendment tracks. Only because the usual First Amendment
rules are suspended can a Treasury Department regulator reject
proposed labels for “King of Hearts” or “St. Paula’s Liquid Wisdom”
beer (the latter featuring an image of the 1898 painting The Conversion
of Paula by Saint Jerome) on the ground that those names and labels
imply forbidden health or medical claims.132
The FTC routinely requires firms to provide substantiation for their
advertising claims on the theory that “a firm’s failure to possess and rely
upon a reasonable basis for objective claims constitutes an unfair or
deceptive act or practice” under § 5 of the FTC Act.133 But for
government to require speakers to establish the truth of their claims
reverses the usual First Amendment burden of proof.134
The challenges don’t abate when we shift our attention from false
advertising law to ordinary trademark law. Trademark infringement
involves a person’s use of a word or mark in a way “likely to cause
132. See Tim Mak, Meet the Beer Bottle Dictator, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/12/meet-the-beer-bottle-dictator.html [https://p
erma.cc/RQ6Z-PXV6].
133. FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, as reprinted in In re
Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984); see also FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts,
Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2010).
134. I could go on. Ordinary First Amendment law calls upon government to interfere
with speech to the least extent possible and, thus, even some commercial speech cases state
that government should not simply ban speech where mandating a disclaimer would do the
job less intrusively. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); see also infra note 147 and
accompanying text. But commercial speech does not follow this rule consistently. Courts,
after all, will rely on survey evidence in private Lanham Act litigation that a firm’s advertising
is misleading notwithstanding that the surveys didn’t test the effect of disclosures. See
Tushnet, supra note 127, at 754.
Ordinary First Amendment law calls for independent appellate review of lower-court
findings that speech is sanctionable; commercial speech law includes no comparable doctrine.
See Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1196–97 (1988).
The trademark cause of action for dilution does not require that speech be false or
misleading at all, and its constitutionality is at the very least questionable. See Mary
LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial
Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709, 709–10 (2007); Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of
Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 212, 294–97 (2013); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 561 (2008). But I’ll
not stress that point here. Part of the tension I emphasize in this Article is that false
advertising and trademark law, in general, are both substantively desirable and inconsistent
with ordinary First-Amendment thinking. By contrast, I do not see dilution law as a good
thing.
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confusion . . . or to deceive” consumers about the origin or sponsorship
of the speaker’s goods or services.135 Trademark infringement is thus “a
specific type of false advertising.”136 The Supreme Court has found
trademark law unexceptional because the “Government constitutionally
may regulate ‘deceptive or misleading’ commercial speech.”137
Perhaps unsurprisingly, thus, trademark law does not play by the
usual First Amendment rules.138 Once again, as with the law of false
advertising, one can be held liable for trademark infringement despite
having had no intention to deceive or mislead.139 Indeed, because
trademark law ties liability to a defendant’s use of a mark in
circumstances creating a likelihood of confusion, a court can find
liability for speech even where there is neither evidence that the
defendant intended to confuse, nor evidence that any flesh-and-blood
consumer in fact was confused.140 This is utterly unexceptional in
trademark law but ought to raise an eyebrow among First Amendment
lawyers.
I said earlier that First Amendment law does not rely on audience
reaction to decide whether speech is protected.141 At the same time,

135. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
136. Rebecca Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness, and
Corporate Reputation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1457, 1475 (2009).
137. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 n.12 (1987)
(quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
138. I’m here referring to routine, everyday applications of trademark law, not simply
those challenges that seem especially First Amendment-y because they involve the incidental
use of trademarks in expressive works. For one of those, see Radiance Foundation, Inc. v.
NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 2015).
139. In practice, a finding of bad faith intent-to-confuse is almost always fatal to a
trademark defendant’s case. Courts, however, commonly find infringement even in the
absence of bad faith. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for
Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1610, 1611 tbl.4 (2006). Courts routinely
ask, as one of several factors to be balanced in trademark infringement cases, whether bad
intent was present, but of the cases in the study sample finding a likelihood of confusion,
approximately one-third found the “intent” factor to be neutral or to favor the defendant. Id.
140. See id. at 1604. Of the cases in Beebe’s sample in which the court found for
plaintiff on the similarity-of-the-marks factor but found no evidence of bad faith intent or
actual confusion, plaintiff prevailed in roughly half. Id. Key considerations in the courts’
ultimate likelihood-of-confusion determinations were the proximity of the goods (e.g., if
plaintiff sells computers, the public is more likely to be confused if defendant sells computer
accessories under a mark similar to plaintiff’s than if it sells food products under the same
mark) and the strength of plaintiff’s mark (i.e., whether the mark is intrinsically well-suited to
uniquely identifying a particular firm—the public is more likely to be confused as to the
source if both products are called Quixip than if both are called Quality). Id. at 1606 fig.3.
141. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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First Amendment jurisprudence usually looks for bad consequences
before imposing sanctions on speech.142 Thus, it disfavors presumed
damages for defamation.143 Absent a showing of bad intent, we do not
rely on any “likelihood” that defamation caused harm to reputation;
First Amendment law in that context calls for a showing of actual
harm.144 The Justices in the Pentagon Papers case, similarly, rejected
judicial relief based on mere “surmise or conjecture that untoward
consequences may result” from the papers’ release.145 Circumstances
where ordinary First Amendment law both dispenses with bad intention
and is willing to presume harm without a separate requirement of proof
fall in the realm of dire emergency or grievous injury—child
pornography, say, or revealing “the sailing dates of transports” during
wartime.146 The use of a trademark in circumstances where consumer
confusion is deemed “likely” is not that. Indeed, the disparity is all the
more clear given that trademark law forbids trademark uses even in
cases where any confusion that might take place will have no effect on
actual consumer purchasing decisions.147
142. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–50 (1974) (concluding courts
may not award presumed damages in defamation cases absent a showing that defendant
published the offending statement with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth).
143. See id.
144. See id. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763
(1985), to be sure, a splintered Court held that presumed damages were permissible without a
heightened scienter showing where the offending speech was credit reporting disseminated to
a small number of subscribers and not involving “matters of public concern.” In doing so,
though, the plurality emphasized the similarity of that speech to commercial speech. Id. at
758 n.5, 762.
145. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 725–26 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Notably, the Pentagon Papers case involved the legitimacy of an
injunction against speech—a so-called prior restraint. That does not undercut my point,
though. Prior restraints are disfavored in First Amendment law in part precisely because they
may be entered without any showing of actual harm (necessarily so, because the feared harm
has not happened yet). See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central
Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 49 (1981) (“When adjudication precedes initial dissemination,
the communication cannot be judged by its actual consequences . . . . The adjudicative
assessment of speech value versus social harm must be made in the abstract, based on
speculation or generalizations . . . .”). And notably as well, trademark and false-advertising
injunctions may also be classed as prior restraints.
146. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)). The well-known Brandenburg test for subversive
advocacy (i.e., speech advocating violence) does incorporate the likelihood that violence will
result but also requires affirmative intention to bring about that violence. See supra note 114
and accompanying text.
147. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 413 (2010); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark
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We might imagine that First Amendment law does not apply in the
trademark context because trademarks are property. But the mere
claim of property rights does not “render free speech issues invisible.”148
Free speech guarantees can’t be avoided simply by characterizing
a speech restriction as an “intellectual property law.” . . . [A] bill
introduced in the 104th Congress would have declared the
United States flag copyrighted, and would have imposed
“criminal penalties for the destruction of a copyrighted flag.”
Congress can’t get around the First Amendment merely by
characterizing otherwise protected speech as treading on a
property interest, as the flag copyright bill sought to do. One still
has to ask whether these intellectual property laws are
unconstitutional speech restrictions . . . .149
Courts have referred to reputation as a property right,150 but that has not
stood in the way of First Amendment limitations on the tort law cause
of action designed to vindicate individual interests in reputation.151
The disjunction between ordinary First Amendment law and the
laws of trademark and false advertising, moreover, is deeper. In the
ultimate analysis, advertising (and trademark) regulation is based on an
understanding of how people respond to speech that is fundamentally
different from that of ordinary First Amendment law.152 “The premise
of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither sheep
nor fools.”153 Ordinary First Amendment law assumes that listeners will
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67 (2012).
Further, notwithstanding the usual First Amendment rule that government should
interfere with speech to the least extent possible (so that even some commercial speech cases
state that government should not simply ban speech where mandating a disclaimer would do
the job less intrusively), see supra note 134, courts’ default response to trademark
infringement is a ban on the offending speech, not an order requiring an appropriate
disclaimer. See Tushnet, supra note 127, at 748.
148. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 182 & n.163 (1998) (quoting Wendy J. Gordon,
A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 (1993)).
149. Id. at 182–83 (footnotes omitted).
150. See id. 182 & n.164.
151. See id.; see also Christine Bohannon, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1123 (2010); Tushnet, supra note 127, at 746. Indeed, the property
analogy is imperfect on its own terms because the law of trespass to chattels at least requires a
showing of actual harm to the property in which plaintiff claims an interest. Bohannon,
supra, at 1125–26.
152. See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 254–57.
153. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258–59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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respond to speech in rational ways.154 That is why, we believe,
“discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine.”155 That is why we say “that the path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies, and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is
good ones.”156
Ordinary First Amendment doctrine rests on the model of the
rational listener157 because it is rational listeners who populate our
aspirational marketplace of ideas in which “who ever knew Truth put to
the wors[t?]”158 The marketplace metaphor assumes that people process
speech on a rational level, and make reasoned judgments about it,
rather than responding confusedly or irrationally.159 The assumed
marketplace-of-ideas participant is “a robust, self-determining agent
fully capable of placing true information in whatever context might be
necessary in order to decide whether or not to act upon it.”160 Indeed,
some argue, failure to incorporate this understanding of the listener into
First Amendment law is to reject the idea of rational self-governance
itself and, thus, the democratic ideal.161
By contrast, consumer protection and trademark law are explicitly
paternalistic. The law prohibits misleading commercial speech where it
appears likely that even a minority of consumers will be confused.162
Yet “[i]magine . . . the moderator at a Meiklejohnian town meeting
ruling a speaker out of order because his ideas were ‘misleading.’”163
Far from taking for granted the “imagined supremely competent
audience”164 of ordinary First Amendment law, consumer protection law
assumes that “the public lacks sophistication”165—that “the buying

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Lidsky, supra note 124, at 815–16.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id.
Lidsky, supra note 124, at 809–16.
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in IV THE WORKS OF JOHN
MILTON 293, 347 (Frank A. Patterson et al. eds., 1931).
159. Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1143–44 (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 135 (1989)).
160. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 156.
161. See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 124, at 840.
162. See supra notes 135–40 and accompanying text.
163. See Post, supra note 89, at 36.
164. Tushnet, supra note 102, at 257.
165. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 383 (1977)) (suggesting that the public in particular lacks sophistication regarding legal
services).
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public will [not] exercise great selectivity and caution in what they
choose to believe of what they hear and read.”166
In order to protect confused members of the buying public, the law
imposes liability without fault, in a manner difficult to predict, often in
contexts where it could not be said that liability is unavoidable to
vindicate compelling state needs.167 “[T]he consumer is not expected to
have the competence or access to information needed to question the
advertiser’s claim, and correction is not to be left to competitors and
mere government counterspeech.”168
Recall my earlier discussion of the complex USDA definition of
what it means for a food to be organic.169 How is government to embark
on that sort of project? Because organic has no predefined meaning,
government has to pour meaning into the word in order to protect
consumers from vendors using it fraudulently, and the only way to do
that is for government to figure out what organic should mean—what a
sensible, intelligent, informed consumer who values organic food would
want it to mean. But by definition here government is not taking
consumers as it finds them. It has to decide what a right-thinking
consumer ought to expect from an organic-labeled food based on its
own evaluation of what is meaningful about being organic and what
isn’t. There is no way to avoid the paternalism in that project.170
Justice Blackmun’s explanation for false advertising law’s apparent
First Amendment free pass was that commercial advertising might be
more easily verifiable by its distributor than other speech and is less
likely to be chilled.171 But neither of these rationales holds up on
examination. Whether advertising is misleading, and thus unprotected,
is in fact not easily verifiable at all; “distinguishing deceptive from
nondeceptive advertising . . . may require resolution of exceedingly
complex and technical factual issues and the consideration of nice
questions of semantics.”172 Is “Glass Wax” a misleading name for a car
polish that contains no wax? Nothing in the advertiser’s special

166. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 156 n.121 (quoting United States v. Articles of Drug,
etc., 263 F. Supp. 212, 216 (D. Neb. 1967)).
167. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
168. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 156.
169. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
170. See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 243.
171. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976).
172. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 645 (1985).
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knowledge provides an answer to this question.173 Even the issue of
whether advertising is factually false may not be at all clear. An
advertiser may be sanctioned for scientific claims that do not relate to its
own product at all, but rather to a competitor’s.174
Other
noncommercial speech that is easily verifiable—say, statements about
the flatness of the earth or purported photographs of the President
meeting with space aliens—is not subjected to a different First
Amendment standard on that account.175
Nor is there much to the argument that commercial advertising is
unusually durable or resilient.176 Yes, advertising is an essential tool in
the pursuit of profit, but so is the noncommercial speech embodied in
for-profit television broadcasting, book publishing, or movie making.
Speech about religion, say, might also be thought to be durable. Nor
does commercial advertising’s purported durability explain why judges
should suddenly shift away from an ordinary First Amendment model in
which consumers must be given the autonomy to weigh purportedly
misleading speech for themselves.177
One response to this contradiction might be for the Court to hold—
as some academics have urged—that government lacks power to
regulate misleading advertising.178 But the Court has shown no interest
in doing that.179 And that’s a good thing. While some features of
current trademark law are undesirable,180 and some aspects of current
consumer protection law are over the top,181 both trademark law and
consumer protection law on balance work well. And they could not
exist in anywhere near their current form if we applied conventional
First Amendment rules.
The reality is that if the law left sellers free to engage in the
“sophisticated deception” of “innuendo, indirect intimations, and
173. See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 232.
174. See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2014).
175. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
L. REV. 627, 635–37 (1990); Post, supra note 89, at 37; Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment
and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U.
L. REV. 1212, 1218 & n.37 (1983).
176. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 175, at 637–38; Shiffrin, supra note 175, at 1218.
177. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 175, at 634–38; Shiffrin, supra note 175, at 1218.
178. See, e.g., Post, supra note 89, at 35–41. Dean Post would allow regulation in limited
contexts where the evaluation of commercial information “requires unusual expertise” or
there is special reason to doubt consumer autonomy. Id. at 41.
179. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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ambiguous suggestions,”182 it would leave the public worse off. The
theory of the marketplace of ideas, in which consumers are mythological
“idealized speech-evaluators,”183 does not describe how consumers in
fact respond to speech. In a world without effective bars against
misleading advertising, intelligent consumers would eventually avoid
deception by learning that nothing said in an advertisement was to be
trusted, but that wouldn’t be a good result either: it would only deny the
producers of superior products any way to distinguish themselves via
their speech to the public.184
The moral—as Rebecca Tushnet has emphasized185—is that the law
of speech used to sell commercial products can protect the interests of
consumers or it can conform to conventional First Amendment rules,
but it cannot do both. We have chosen a body of law that, by and large,
promotes accurate consumer understanding even where doing so
effectively requires ordinary First Amendment doctrine to give way.
Not all aspects of that body of law are perfect; but it has been in place
for many decades, and it works tolerably well. From a policy
perspective, it seems straightforward. From the standpoint of First
Amendment law, though, it presents a paradox. That’s the knot we
have to unravel.
IV. CORPORATE SPEECH
We can better understand the commercial speech puzzle if we look
at it in the context of the law of corporate speech in general. Here, the
foundational case is First National Bank v. Bellotti,186 decided just two
years after Virginia Board.187 But to understand Bellotti, we need to
take a step back and consider how the free speech rights of corporate
entities came to be at issue.
Corporate speech is a hot issue these days because a few years ago,
in Citizens United v. FEC,188 the Supreme Court struck down a federal
law restricting for-profit corporations’ ability to speak in connection

182. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978).
183. See Tushnet, supra note 108, at 312.
184. See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 253; see also Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing
and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 99–129 (2006); George A. Akerlof, The Market for
“Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanisms, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
185. See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 257.
186. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
187. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
188. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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with candidate elections.189 The law, the Court told us, was baldly
unconstitutional, impermissibly depriving a corporation of “the right to
use speech . . . to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speakers’
voice.”190 The majority and the dissenters in Citizens United differed
over whether the First Amendment forbade Congress to restrict speech
by for-profit corporations, paid for with corporate treasury funds, that
advocates the election or defeat of a political candidate and is
disseminated via broadcast, cable, or satellite immediately before an
election.191 But they agreed about corporations’ ability to rely on the
189. Id. at 372. The statutory provision, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), on its face imposed
restrictions on both for-profit and nonprofit corporations. The Court had interpreted the
provision, though, to exempt nonprofit corporations that were “formed for the express
purpose of promoting political ideas,” had no shareholders with a claim on their assets or
earnings, and received no contributions from for-profit corporations or unions. FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
209–11 (2003) (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264). The key impact of the law, thus, was on forprofit corporations, unions, and entities funded by for-profit corporations and unions.
190. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41.
191. I do not intend in this Article to spend any significant time on the merits of the
Citizens United decision. I will say here that in my view the dissenters had the better side of
the debate—that Congress had power to enact its regulation even assuming the full First
Amendment status of corporate speech. That matter has been addressed in many other
places at far greater length than here. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); Steven L. Winter, Citizens
Disunited, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133 (2011) (calling the Court’s conflation of individual and
corporate speech rights “dangerously oversimplified”). Very briefly: the restriction at issue in
Citizens United addressed the dissemination, via broadcast, cable, or satellite, in the time
period shortly before an election, of communications “susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate” by for-profit
corporations using their general treasury funds (or by other entities that were the recipients
of those funds). Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–25 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551
U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007)); see also 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2006); id. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (drawing a
distinction between treasury and political action committee (PAC) funds); Wis. Right to Life,
551 U.S. at 465–69 (explaining when speech should be deemed “the functional equivalent of
express advocacy”); MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263–65 (holding that the law does not apply to
nonprofit advocacy groups accepting no contributions from business corporations, even
where the nonprofit groups take corporate form).
The Court majority began its
condemnation of the law by explaining that the First Amendment “[p]rohibit[s]” any
“restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not
others.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. As the dissenters explained, though, this is
unfounded: government imposes different speech restrictions on the incarcerated and the
free, the military service member and the civilian, the government employee and the member
of the private sector, the student and the nonstudent, the foreigner and the citizen. Id. at 420
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, if government could not
distinguish between corporate and individual speakers, then well-established federal
securities law would be called into question. See Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and
the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 871 (2007). While a variety of
distinctions can be offered to justify different treatment of individuals and corporations
speaking with treasury funds, it is sufficient at this juncture to point to the so-far-at-least well-
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First Amendment in the first place192: Justice Stevens in dissent felt it
necessary to note that “[o]f course . . . no one suggests” that speech falls
outside First Amendment protection simply because it comes from a
corporation.193
Post-Citizens United, others have challenged that consensus. Some
scholars have urged that corporations shouldn’t be seen as First
Amendment rightsholders at all—that they are not “persons” within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and should not be able to assert
First Amendment claims.194 Other scholars have characterized the
Supreme Court’s regard for for-profit corporations’ First Amendment
rights as a revival of Lochner for the modern age.195 So what about
that? Why should corporations’ speech be protected? After all, as
Justice Stevens put it, corporations “have no consciences, no beliefs, no
feelings, no thoughts, no desires. . . . [T]hey are not themselves members
of ‘We the People.’”196
I should be clear that the real debate here is over expenditures by
for-profit, non-media corporations. Few today would contest that
speech by organizations such as the League of Conservation Voters
should enjoy First Amendment protection, notwithstanding the
accepted ban on corporate contributions to political candidates, and to Congress’s
understanding that corporate electioneering expenditures are viewed by donors, candidates,
and the general public alike as functionally indistinguishable from contributions, raising the
same danger of a corrupt relationship between government and business. See Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 447–60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “A democracy
cannot function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being bought and
sold.” Id. at 453; see also infra notes 309–10 and accompanying text. But see Minn. Citizens
Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 n.12 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(suggesting that Citizens United leaves the ban on corporate contributions to political
candidates “on shaky ground”). See generally Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the
Corporate Contribution Ban, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 397 (2015) (arguing that the corporate
contribution ban should be upheld as reinforcing limits on individual contributions and
protecting the rights of dissenting shareholders).
192. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–41 (majority opinion); id. at 445 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. Id. at 445 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”:
From Freedom of Association to Freedom of The Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 5, 39–51 (2012); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional
Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221 (2011).
195. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1119, 1148 (2015); Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2343, 2388–91 (2014); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New
Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 198–203 (2014).
196. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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organization’s status as a corporation.197 Speech undertaken by an
association of individuals who have come together for the purpose of
promoting political ideas, and funded solely by those individuals, raises
none of the issues that motivate public concern about for-profit
corporations’ speech.198 Indeed, Supreme Court case law champions
individuals’ ability to associate for just those political and advocacy
purposes.199
For-profit corporations, though, might present a different story. The
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation means
that—at least for the estimated 10% of American corporations,
employing about half of the workforce, that are not closely held200—it is
much less plain whether the entity’s expenditures for speech can or
should be seen as emanating from the shareholders, whom we are to
suppose have associated for purposes of funding this speech. The
shareholders are not directing this speech; they may or may not agree
with it; except in the most unusual of cases, they could not stop it if they
tried; and their contribution of funds to the entity has nothing to do with
its speech activities.201
Just as First Amendment protection for nonprofit corporations is
uncontroversial, it is uncontroversial that members of the news media
should be able to assert First Amendment protections.202 That is so even
when they are organized as for-profit corporations.203 That point was
adequately settled fifty years ago in New York Times v. Sullivan, when
197. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (concluding that “the concerns underlying the
regulation of corporate political activity are simply absent” when it comes to voluntary
political associations in nonprofit corporate form).
198. See id.
199. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958); see
also First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805 (White, J., dissenting).
200. See Alison Griswold, How Many People Could the Hobby Lobby Ruling Affect?,
SLATE: MONEYBOX BLOG (June 30, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2
014/06/30/hobby_lobby_supreme_court_ruling_how_many_people_work_at_closely_held_cor
porations.html [https://perma.cc/W84W-W4AX]. On the distinction between closely held and
other corporations, see infra notes 415–17 and accompanying text.
201. See Anthony Kammer & Liz Kennedy, Who Decides When a Corporation Spends
Money in Politics?, DEMOS (June 19, 2013), http://www.demos.org/publication/who-decideswhen-corporation-spends-money-politics [https://perma.cc/3NX8-UZZR].
202. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966).
203. The statutory provision struck down in Citizens United, thus, made plain that it did
not restrict the media distribution of “any news story, commentary, or editorial.” 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2006). The legislative history indicates that Congress
included that language in the statute so as to “assure[] the unfettered right of the newspapers,
TV networks, and other media to cover and comment on political campaigns.” H.R. REP.
NO. 93-1239, at 4 (1974).
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the Court rejected the claim that the for-profit activity of the New York
Times (a corporation) lessened its First Amendment protection against
defamation liability.204 I’ll return to this question later on: Can we really
so easily distinguish between media entities and other for-profit
corporations?205 For now, though, I’ll focus on the constitutional
protection of expenditures by for-profit, non-media corporations for the
purpose of disseminating speech.
A. The Significance of “Persons”
I’ll get one issue quickly out of the way: at least as a textual matter, it
won’t work to make the issue of constitutional protection for
corporations’ speech depend on whether corporations are “persons.”206
Stepping back from the First Amendment and looking to the
Constitution as a whole, it seems plain that corporations should be able
to assert some constitutional claims. If a state law oversteps the
Constitution’s federalism-based limitations on state power, such as the
so-called Dormant Commerce Clause207 or the Article I, Section 10
limitations on state authority,208 then it’s hard to imagine why a
corporation ought not to be able to challenge that action. The Supreme
Court heard such claims by corporations early on.209 The Court even
earlier allowed a corporation to argue that a state had unconstitutionally
impaired the obligation of contracts; that decision came in 1819, just
thirty years after the Constitution came into force.210

204. 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964).
205. See infra notes 406–12 and accompanying text.
206. For a contrary approach, see David H. Gans & Douglas T. Kendall, A Capitalist
Joker: The Strange Origins, Disturbing Part, and Uncertain Future of Corporate Personhood in
American Law, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 643 (2011).
207. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
208. Id. art. I, § 10.
209. See, e.g., Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867); Steamship Co.
v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450 (1864).
210. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); see also W.
River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). The Contracts Clause was the most
frequently litigated section of the Constitution during the nineteenth century. See Barnitz v.
Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 121 (1896).
In the Dartmouth College case, a 1769 charter had incorporated a corporate body under
the name “The Trustees of Dartmouth College,” and it was that body that brought suit. Trs.
of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 624–26. Under the law of the time, the trustees acting in their
official capacities were constituted as a body corporate. See id. at 635–39. They were not
acting to preserve their individual property; none of them had individual rights in the
property of the corporation. See id. at 639–43. Rather, the corporation filed suit to vindicate
its own rights. Id. at 626–27.
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While the federal government didn’t exercise its eminent domain
power before the 1870s,211 and the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause
wasn’t deemed to constrain the states until the very end of the
nineteenth century,212 state courts at least as early as 1828 extended to
corporations the benefit of the general principle that “compensation is a
necessary attendant on the due and constitutional exercise of the power
of the lawgiver to deprive an individual of his property without his
consent.”213
Immunizing state governments from corporations’ legal attacks,
when they enact protectionist laws and impose trade barriers, would
pointlessly undercut substantive constitutional law principles. It would
be odd to say that whether a protectionist state law is unconstitutional
depends on whether the interstate businesses that it disadvantages take
individual or corporate form. And allowing governments arbitrarily to
seize a corporation’s property without compensation would hurt
shareholders in a way inconsistent with constitutional values.
At the same time, corporations aren’t entitled to the same
constitutional protections as individual human beings. Most obviously,
they’re not “citizens of the United States” within the meaning of the
Fifteenth Amendment and cannot vote.214 They can’t assert a Fifth

211. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 709 n.78 (1985).
212. Compare Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–41 (1897),
with Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
420, 539–40 (1837) (stating that absent a contracts clause violation, states did not violate the
federal Constitution merely because they extinguished “antecedent vested rights of property”
(quoting Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88, 110 (1834))).
213. Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Conn. River Co., 7 Conn. 28, 49 (1828); see also White
River Tpk. Co. v. Vt. Cent. R.R., 21 Vt. 590, 595 (1849) (stating that plaintiffs comprising a
corporation and complaining of a taking of the corporation’s property “are entitled to the
same constitutional protection to their property, that an individual would be”). Note that in
these cases—in contrast to Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. 518—the courts addressed
what we would today characterize as for-profit, closely held corporations and saw no
distinction between the property of the corporation and that of the individuals who
constituted it.
214. Nor is a corporation a “citizen” within the meaning of Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839), or the Fourteenth Amendment’s parallel provision, Pembina
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888). A corporation can
take advantage of Article III diversity jurisdiction, which by its terms is limited to
controversies “between Citizens of different States”—but even in so ruling, Chief Justice
Marshall was emphatic “[t]hat invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity,
a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen.” Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.215
Granting
corporations the right to vote in public elections would contravene basic
constitutional values. Reading the Constitution so that individuals were
immunized from giving testimony that would incriminate their corporate
employers would extend the Fifth Amendment privilege in ways that
don’t follow from its underlying goals.216
Should we draw the line between those contexts in which
corporations may assert constitutional claims, and those in which they
may not, by asking whether the constitutional clause in question
specifies rights in “persons”? Well, no. The First Amendment doesn’t
refer to “persons” at all—it simply provides that Congress may not
make a “law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”217 So the argument
that corporations shouldn’t have First Amendment rights because
they’re not “persons” has no textual basis: from a textual perspective,
the extent to which Congress can restrict corporate speech has nothing
to do with their personhood. The question is simply whether such
legislation “abridg[es] the freedom of speech.”218
Now, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does grant
rights to “persons,”219 and therefore, the standard textual justification
for imposing any Bill of Rights provision as a restriction on state
governments requires that the rightsholder be a “person.”220 But it
would be an odd sort of federalism, in 2014, that held that the national
government faces constitutional restrictions in limiting corporate speech
while the states do not. Rather, the pervasive message of the modern
incorporation cases is that the national government and the states are
subject to identical Bill-of-Rights-derived constraints.221
215. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 82–83 (1906). On constitutional protections for
corporations, see generally Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal
Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in
Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1996); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving
Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629.
216. See Henning, supra note 215, at 816–21; Pollman, supra note 215, at 1648–49; see
also Hale, 201 U.S. at 69–70.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
218. But see infra note 414.
219. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
220. See Pembina Consol. Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188–89
(1888).
221. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Once it is decided that a
particular Bill of Rights guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice,’ the
same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.”
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968))); cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213–25 (1995) (finding that federal and state governments are subject to
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I will suggest much later in this Article that the question whether we
should view corporations as “persons” isn’t entirely misplaced.222 For
now, though, the better question is whether allowing corporations to
assert claims under a given constitutional provision advances the goals
that that provision was designed to serve—put another way, whether
restrictions on corporations’ speech abridge “the freedom of speech”
that the amendment was designed to protect.223 That suggests that we
should ask here whether treating corporations as First Amendment
rightsholders advances First Amendment goals and what effect that
constitutional understanding has on the overall system of free
expression.
B. Corporations and First Amendment Values
So how should we understand for-profit, nonmedia corporations’
speech? Would it make sense simply to declare it entirely outside the
bounds of the First Amendment so that government could restrict it at
will, perhaps even on content-based grounds? After all, we don’t read
the Constitution to provide blanket protection to anything at all that
involves words and communication: otherwise, statutes criminalizing
conspiracy, solicitation of crime, perjury, and espionage would be
constitutionally problematic.224 Our First Amendment rules, rather,
identify protected speech by looking to First Amendment values.225
We protect speech in part because of its connection to individual
self-fulfillment—because of the idea that that speech is crucial to the full
realization of each individual’s character and potential as a human
being.226
Put another way, we protect speech because it is a
the same equal protection constraints, constitutional text notwithstanding).
222. See infra text accompanying notes 384–89.
223. See Pollman, supra note 215, at 1670–75; Susanna Kim Ripken, Citizens United,
Corporate Personhood, and Corporate Power: The Tension Between Constitutional Law and
Corporate Law, 6 UNIV. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 286–87 (2012).
224. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961); ROBERT C. POST,
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 2–3 (2012).
225. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 3–15 (1966); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY 15–86 (1982); see also Greenawalt, supra note 159, at 121; Louis H. Mayo, The Free
Forum: Development of a Democratic Forum in the Limited Media of Mass Communication,
22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 393–94 (1954). Some have argued that too strong a reliance on
First Amendment “values” risks under protecting speech. See CBS v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). But see Frederick Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 279–80
(1981).
226. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970);
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manifestation of individual freedom—“an integral part of the
development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of
self.”227
Protecting a for-profit corporation’s speech does not advance that
goal.228 A for-profit corporation’s speech is driven not by individual
personality but by shareholder return; it is disconnected from individual
self-realization or the development of character. It does not function to
realize the speaker’s human potential. It is not part of the questioning
mind’s “affirmation of self.”229
We protect speech in part because of its connection to political selfgovernment. The process of talking about political issues is part of selfgovernment.230 In democracy, citizens through their collective speech
shape a common democratic will: they constitute and reconstitute the
public opinion that is “the final source of government in a democratic
state.”231 Once again, though, a for-profit corporation’s speech is not
part of that project of democratic determination because corporations
(as distinguished from their owners and employees) are not citizens and
thus are not part of the project of democratic self-governance.232
On the other hand, corporate speech can connect to First
Amendment values in other ways. Speech promotes self-government
whenever it informs the citizenry of information and arguments they
need in order to govern themselves intelligently.233 Speech informing
EMERSON, supra note 225, at 4–7; see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 33 (1941) (“The First Amendment protects . . . the need of many men to
express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living . . . .”). And for that
matter, see MILTON, supra note 158, at 324 (licensing of the press is “the greatest displeasure
and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him”).
227. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting
EMERSON, supra note 225, at 5).
228. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (“To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom of
conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality. . . . It is recognized that corporate
free speech rights do not arise because corporations . . . have any interest in selfexpression.”); see also Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 24, at 14–15 (discussing commercial
speech).
229. See C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976).
230. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
231. Post, supra note 89, at 7 (quoting Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917)); see also Robert C. Post, The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 639, 671 (1990).
232. See C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial
Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2004).
233. If the citizens who are to decide an issue “are denied acquaintance with
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the public about the abuse of official power is “the most potent of all
restraints upon misgovernment.”234 Indeed, not only when it comes to
matters of self-government but also with respect to ideas and
information generally, speech is said to facilitate the search for truth.235
All this is true without regard to the identity of the speaker.
In the 1978 case of First National Bank v. Bellotti,236 the Court struck
down a Massachusetts statute making it illegal for a wide range of
corporations to spend money in order to “influenc[e] or affect[] the vote
on any question submitted to the voters [via referendum], other than
one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the
corporation.”237 Justice Powell’s majority opinion emphasized that forprofit corporations’ speech serves First Amendment values in the ways I
have just described.238
Corporations as well as individuals can
contribute political argument and information to the public store.
Information relevant to a political issue can as well come from a
corporate source as from an individual one: “The inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual.”239 Rather than merely protecting individual selfexpression, the Bellotti Court held, the First Amendment “prohibit[s]
government from limiting the stock of information from which members
of the public may draw.”240 No matter what its source, if speech is

information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, . . . the
result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good.” ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948).
234. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); see also Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 616 (quoting
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)); see also First Nat’l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam);
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966); Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html [https://perma.cc/Y2Q4-X54F].
235. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market[place of ideas] . . . .”).
See generally Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., Free
Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First
Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 188–94 (1972).
236. 435 U.S. 765.
237. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977), quoted in Bellotti, 435 U.S.
at 768 n.2.
238. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781–83.
239. Id. at 777.
240. Id. at 783.
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silenced, then the community loses the contribution that speech would
have made.241
Moreover—the Court continued—whatever the source of speech, its
regulation allows government to skew the public debate by substituting
the fiat of government officials for the competition of ideas.242 “To be
sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this
would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the
electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.”243 In sum, the Bellotti Court
concluded, speech does not lose its First Amendment protection “simply
because its source is a corporation.”244
Bellotti was decided two years after Virginia Board,245 and Justice
Powell’s majority opinion—perhaps unsurprisingly—echoes the points
Justice Blackmun had made in that earlier case.246 Powell cites Virginia
Board three times,247 quoting it twice.248
Arguably, the First
Amendment claim in Bellotti was the more vulnerable one. In Virginia
Board, the challenged government rule applied to every pharmacist in
the state, regardless of his or her employer;249 it was plain that
pharmacists were First Amendment speakers, and the only question was
whether their rights extended to commercial speech.250 In Bellotti, by
contrast, Justice Rehnquist in dissent was convinced that a corporation
had no right to engage in speech except that necessarily incidental to its
business.251 As a creature of the state, he urged, a corporation
“possesse[d] only those properties which the charter of creation
confer[ed] upon it.”252 But Justice Rehnquist lost, in significant part
241. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1974) (1859).
242. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–77 & n.11, 784–85; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of other
ideas.”); see also SCHAUER, supra note 225, at 81–86; Lidsky, supra note 124, at 817–18.
243. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790.
244. Id. at 784; see also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 533–35
(1980).
245. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
246. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775–95.
247. Id. at 783, 784 n.20, 791 n.31.
248. Id. at 783, 791 n.31.
249. 425 U.S. 748, 749–50 (1976) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54.524.35 (1974)).
250. See id. at 760–61.
251. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 824–28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
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because the logic of Virginia Board swept his argument aside.253 If limits
on corporate speech deprived consumers and voters of vital information,
disserving their autonomy by denying them the enlightenment they
needed to make political choices, then any focus on the status of the
speaker was simply misplaced.254
C. Austin and the Marketplace of Ideas
And yet the Court has articulated an alternative vision to Bellotti’s.
The foundational authority there is Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce.255 That 1990 case concerned a Michigan statute that barred
corporations from using their treasury funds for speech “in assistance of,
or in opposition to, the nomination or election of a [political]
candidate.”256 Corporations, rather, could engage in such speech only

253. Both sides recognized that the rights of commercial and corporate speakers were
parallel. Justice Rehnquist, arguing in a later case that the state could subject corporate
speakers to compelled speech requirements, relied on commercial speech precedent; he
explained that in both contexts courts deemed the First Amendment to apply only for the
sake of informing the public. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 34
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
254. Justice Rehnquist’s view of corporate speakers was consistent with his larger
position that government is only lightly constrained in imposing speech restrictions as a
condition of the receipt of government benefits. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 403 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that an educational radio station,
having accepted public money, cannot avoid the editorializing-ban condition that “Congress
legitimately attached to receipt of that funding”); see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588–90 (1998); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991) (approving a
ban by certain government grantees on “advocat[ing] abortion”); FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 506 (2009) (stating that because the government grants
broadcasters “free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain,”
they are subject to “public obligations” constraining their speech (quoting CBS v. FCC, 453
U.S. 367, 395 (1981))); Sullivan, supra note 92, at 149–50, 159–60.
Justice Rehnquist acted consistently with that belief when (without separate opinion) he
joined the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). See infra
Part IV.C. But no other Justice has followed that path. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310, 465 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declining to
draw First Amendment conclusions from a corporation’s arguable status as “a grantee of a
state concession”).
255. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
256. Id. at 655 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.206(1) (1979)). The statute at issue
in Austin, like the one in Citizens United (see supra note 189), on its face applied to both forprofit and nonprofit corporations. In litigation, the plaintiff—the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce—emphasized its status as a nonprofit corporation. As the Court noted, though,
the nonprofit chamber was populated and funded by for-profit corporations and acted as a
service bureau for them; unless statutorily restrained, it could “circumvent the Act’s
restrictions” by acting as a conduit for its members’ spending. Austin, 494 U.S. at 661–65.
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using funds generated by voluntary contributions from the corporation’s
stockholders, officers, and employees.257
To better understand Austin, we need to look to the history of
federal election restrictions. In 1907, Congress banned corporate
contributions to candidates for federal elective office.258 In 1947,
Congress enacted a rule forbidding corporate expenditures on speech
relating to federal elections.259 It tweaked that rule in the 1971 Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA), which allowed corporations to
establish PACs to engage in such speech; the PACs could not receive
the corporation’s treasury funds, but they could receive individual
contributions by stockholders and certain employees.260
The Court in 1982 approved the federal corporate contribution ban,
explaining that corporations could exploit “substantial aggregations of
wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate
form of organization.”261 It addressed the federal ban on corporate
expenditures four years later, in 1986.262

257. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.255(2)–(3).
258. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907); see also Adam Winkler, “Other People’s
Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 871
(2004).
259. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, sec. 304, § 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60
(1947).
260. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 302, 86 Stat. 3, 12–13 (1972).
261. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1982). The case
involved a challenge to a FECA provision forbidding a corporation to solicit contributions for
its PAC from persons not adequately connected to it. Id. at 198–99. This PAC restriction was
an adjunct to the larger ban on corporate contributions and expenditures, and made no sense
without it. A unanimous Court held that any First Amendment interests of NRWC’s were
“overborne” by the goals Congress had sought to achieve in the underlying statutory plan: “to
ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go
with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political ‘war chests’
which could be used to incur political debts” and “to protect the individuals who have paid
money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from
having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.” Id. at
207–08. Because the NRWC sought to make contributions to political candidates rather than
expenditures on their behalf, however, the Court had no occasion to address Austin’s
distortion rationale.
262. The Court had already heard two cases involving the statute’s parallel restriction
on union speech. In one of those cases, the Court ducked the union’s claim that the
restriction was unconstitutional as applied to it; the majority, seeing unions and corporations
as similarly situated, characterized Congress as seeking “to avoid the deleterious influences
on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large
aggregations of capital.” United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957); see also
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 415–16 (1972) (Congress
sought “to eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections.”).
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In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), the question was
whether the FECA expenditure limitation could constitutionally be
applied to nonprofit corporations that were “formed for the express
purpose of promoting political ideas,” had no shareholders with a claim
on their assets or earnings, and received no contributions from for-profit
corporations or unions.263 The Court held that it could not—but none of
the nine Justices saw a problem with Congress’s larger move to restrict
corporate speech in response to concerns about “the corrosive influence
of concentrated corporate wealth.”264 The Court explained that “[d]irect
corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that
resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide
an unfair advantage in the political marketplace”—an advantage that
was unfair because “[t]he resources in the treasury of a business
corporation . . . are not an indication of popular support for the
corporation’s political ideas.”265 It continued, however, that the
exempted category of nonprofits did not pose “the potential for unfair
deployment of wealth for political purposes” that other corporations
did.266
With that background, it was not surprising that the Austin Court in
1990 upheld Michigan’s statute, which largely paralleled the FECA.267
The majority began by noting Bellotti’s holding that “[t]he mere fact
that [plaintiff] is a corporation does not remove its speech from the
ambit of the First Amendment”;268 it held that the state regulation could
be justified only with reference to a compelling state interest.269 But the
Court had no difficulty finding such an interest.270 Corporations, it
explained, had “legal advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate
wealth.”271 They could use those advantages to amass immense
resources without regard to the extent of any public support for their
political views.272 And their deployment of that wealth could allow them
to “unfairly influence elections”—giving them “an unfair advantage in
263. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986).
264. Id. at 257.
265. Id. at 257–58.
266. Id. at 259. The dissenting Justices would have held that the statutory bar could
constitutionally be applied to all nonprofit corporations. Id. at 266–67 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
267. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668–69 (1990).
268. Id. at 657.
269. Id. at 658.
270. Id. at 660.
271. Id. at 665 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258 n.11).
272. Id. at 660.
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the political marketplace,” with “corrosive and distorting effects”
undermining “the integrity of the political process.”273
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Austin reflects the view—and the
concern—that success of a message in the marketplace of ideas will turn
to some extent on the economic resources available to the speaker.274
From the perspective of anyone other than a First Amendment lawyer,
that view is unexceptional. It’s really hard to argue that the political and
cultural views prevailing in a society are wholly independent of the
money spent to advance particular ways of looking at the world.275
To be sure, First Amendment law is built on the view summarized by
Jerome Barron as the “romantic view of the First Amendment”—that
more speech is always better, that the “self-correcting force of ‘full and
free discussion’” will always overcome biases in the marketplace of ideas
so long as government can be kept from interfering.276 We encountered
that view in considering the First Amendment context of false
advertising law.277 But false advertising law recognizes that the
“romantic view” is in important respect mythology.278 Commentators
273. Id. at 659–60, 668 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257). The fact that the Michigan law
left corporations free to participate in politics using segregated funds, the Court continued,
demonstrated its narrow tailoring. Id. at 668–69.
Justice Brennan, concurring, took a somewhat different approach: he emphasized the
value of Michigan’s law in protecting stockholders who did not agree with a corporate
manager’s decision to use their property to electioneer. Id. at 673–75 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also Winkler, supra note 266, at 874.
274. See Austin, 494 U.S at 658–59.
275. See Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1149–57. To be sure, that a message is well
financed does not mean that, in the short-term, it will swing an election or cause the passage
of legislation; over the history of American politics, many well-financed candidates and ballot
propositions have failed. Some of that resistance relates to the strong status quo bias of
American politics. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 572 (2014).
Moreover, in candidate elections where both candidates have ample financial support from
wealthy backers, other factors, such as partisanship and incumbency status, will come to the
fore. See Kyle Kondik & Geoffrey Skelley, 14 From ‘14: Quick Takes on the Midterm, U.
VA. CTR. FOR POL.: SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.centerforpolitics.
org/crystalball/articles/14-from-14-quick-takes-on-the-midterm/ [https://perma.cc/B9UF-VM5
C]; see also Lee Drutman, How Much Did Money Really Matter in 2012?, SUNLIGHT FOUND.
BLOG (Nov. 9, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/11/09/how-much-didmoney-matter [https://perma.cc/XMF5-JT8R] (concluding that the connection between
political spending and electoral victory was weak in 2012 House of Representatives general
election races).
276. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641, 1642–43 (1967).
277. See supra notes 153–85 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Barron, supra note 276, at 1647–50; Stanley Ingber, The
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sometimes defend that mythology as necessary to avoid paternalistic or
undesirable results,279 or treat the deficiencies of the romantic view as
“an insight more fundamental than we can use.”280 But law and ideology
are one thing; social reality is another.
Recent empirical social science research makes it clear, if more
proof were needed, that the romantic view of the First Amendment
incompletely describes the notional marketplace of ideas supporting
U.S. government elections and decision making.281 That research
teaches us, for example, that the views of wealthy Americans and
business-oriented interest groups play a major role in shaping
government policy, while the views of ordinary Americans—to the
extent they diverge from those of their wealthier neighbors—appear to
play no role at all.282 Business interest groups have substantial influence
on government policy,283 notwithstanding that the correlation between
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1; Lidsky, supra note 124;
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1985); Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1148–49; Owen M. Fiss, Comment, State
Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087 (1991).
279. See Lidsky, supra note 124; Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1993).
280. That was the way Harry Kalven described Ronald Coase’s challenge to broadcast
licensing. Harry Kalven, Jr., Broadcasting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. &
ECON. 15, 30–32 (1967) (initial capitalization of each word omitted).
281. See Gilens & Page, supra note 275, at 571–72.
282. See id. Because the preferences of ordinary Americans overlap substantially with
those of their wealthier neighbors, the strong connection between wealthy Americans’
preferences and government policy choices means that the views of ordinary Americans end
up being vindicated much of the time. But on many key issues, those preferences differ. The
very wealthy tend to see budget deficits as the most pressing problem facing this country;
almost no ordinary Americans agree. The very wealthy, on average, support cutting
government spending on Social Security and health care; ordinary Americans support
increasing such spending. See Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences
of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 56 (2013). Similarly, ordinary Americans tend
to favor an expanded government role in making available jobs, health care, and quality
education to all; the wealthiest Americans do not. See id. at 57–60.
283. Political scientists, to be sure, are not unanimous on this point. See Beth L. Leech,
Lobbying and Influence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
AND INTEREST GROUPS 534, 537 (L. Sandy Maisel & Jeffrey M. Berry eds., 2010)
(“[Q]uantitative studies of the influence of lobbying and PACs are . . . contradictory . . . .”).
That said, “[n]umerous case studies have detailed instances in which all but the most
dedicated skeptic is likely to perceive interest group influence at work.” Gilens & Page, supra
note 275, at 567; see also Leech, supra, at 551. Conditional interest group power based on
“alliance making and provision of information” pervades American politics and is
problematic given that “alliances are forged in part because of abilities to raise campaign
funds and . . . some interests have a much greater capacity to create and compile
information.” Leech, supra, at 551. On the substantial influence of campaign contributions
on legislator voting behavior, see DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E.B. STRAUSE, THE NEW
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the preferences of ordinary Americans and the policy positions of
business interest groups is negative—that is, policy changes supported
by ordinary Americans tend to be opposed by business interest groups,
and vice versa.284
Nor should that be at all surprising. After all, American political
decision making is the product of investments in a variety of speech
markets. One such market is lobbying. Corporate money spent on
lobbying far exceeds that spent on elections. Total spending by all
outside groups285 on federal campaigns in the 2012 election cycle barely
(This sum includes all corporate
topped a billion dollars.286
contributions and expenditures, but it also includes a rather larger
amount of spending paid for by individuals.)287 By contrast, federal
lobbying expenditures from 2008 through 2013 ranged from $3.24 to
$3.52 billion dollars.288 It is fair to assume that the overwhelming
majority of that lobbying was funded by for-profit corporations.

SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 71–98 (2014),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/thenewsoftmoney/wp-content/uploads/sites/57/2014/06/the-new-softmoney-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YSD-D3MD].
284. See Gilens & Page, supra note 275, at 571–72. This work provides a corrective to
the oft-expressed earlier view that interest groups, in the aggregate, reflect the views of
ordinary voters. Compare ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 335 (1989),
and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND
PUBLIC OPINION 262–82 (2d ed. 1971) (interest-group competition yields broadly
majoritarian results), with MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 132–67 (1965), and CHARLES E. LINDBLOM,
POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 261–75 (1977)
(noting systematic ways in which some interest groups, and particularly business groups, are
more effective than others).
285. By “outside groups,” I mean entities other than the candidates’ own campaigns and
the Democratic and Republican National Committees. This includes spending funded by
either individuals or corporations.
286. See Russ Choma, The 2012 Election: Our Price Tag (Finally) for the Whole Ball of
Wax, OPENSECRETS.ORG: BLOG (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/03/t
he-2012-election-our-price-tag-fin/ [https://perma.cc/RHJ8-2XL3].
287. Most outside spending in the 2012 federal election came from Super PACs, and
only 11% of Super PAC funding in that cycle came from for-profit businesses. BLAIR BOWIE
& ADAM LIOZ, DẼMOS, MILLION-DOLLAR MEGAPHONES: SUPER PACS AND UNLIMITED
OUTSIDE SPENDING IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS 9 (2012), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/fil
es/publications/MegaphonesMillionaires-DemosUSPIRG.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW5T-KQ2P
]. The law prohibits corporations from contributing to federal candidates or the national
parties.
288. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG: BLOG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php [https://perma.cc/MYW9-BJKY] (last updated
Jan. 22, 2106).
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Certainly all of the biggest spenders on lobbying are for-profit
corporations or funded by them.289
And perhaps neither of these is the most important way corporate
spending affects the public discourse. Stepping out of the realm of
politics writ small, consider that still more money (much more) is spent
on the subject of the first two parts of this Article: commercial
advertising.290 According to one estimate, total U.S. advertising
expenditures in 2011 were $144 billion.291 Proctor & Gamble was the
biggest spender, accounting for about three billion dollars’ worth of
advertising all by itself.292 And that spending matters. Americans
“spend more time exposed to advertising than they spend eating,
reading, cooking, praying, cleaning and making love combined.”293
Advertising forms our culture, in the first instance because of the media
support it provides: broadcast television draws almost all of its revenue
from advertising, and consumer magazines more than half.294 Media
executives’ decisions about which audiences to go after, and which
content to offer those audiences, ultimately rely on advertisers’
decisions about which audiences they want to sell to.295
Advertising helps create, and reflects back to us, a common symbolic
culture built around the operative values of our economy. It has been

289. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Top Spenders, OPENSECRETS.ORG: BLOG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=2013&indexType=s [https://perma.cc/
P89Z-ZKBA] (last visited Jan. 21, 2016). The biggest spender was the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, spending approximately $74 million in 2013. The Chamber is formally non-profit
but is funded entirely by for-profit corporations and engages in speech on its corporate
members’ behalf, much as the Michigan Chamber of Commerce did in Austin, see supra note
256.
290. The largest U.S. corporations spend, on average, about 2% of their budget on
commercial ads. Patricia Laya, Do You Pay Enough for Advertising? One Big Corporation
Spent a Jaw-Dropping $4.2 Billion Last Year, BUS. INSIDER (June 6, 2011),
http://www.businessinsider.com/corporations-ad-spending-2011-6?op=1 [https://perma.cc/TH7
E-92BQ].
291. Kantar Media Reports U.S. Advertising Expenditures Increased 0.8 Percent in 2011,
BUSINESS WIRE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120312005272/e
n/Kantar-Media-Reports-U.S.-Advertising-Expenditures-Increased [https://perma.cc/CE86D7LE].
292. Id.
293. TERRY O’REILLY & MIKE TENNANT, THE AGE OF PERSUASION: HOW
MARKETING ATE OUR CULTURE, at xiv (2009).
294. Joseph Turow & Matthew P. McAllister, Introduction to THINKING CRITICALLY
ABOUT ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER CULTURE, IN THE ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER
CULTURE READER 3–4 (Joseph Turow & Matthew P. McAllister eds., 2009).
295. See id.; see also C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 66
(1994).
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characterized as “the official art of modern capitalist society”296 because,
just as art presents a context for the larger world, a way of categorizing
and experiencing the facts of our lives,297 commercial advertising
provides powerful support for the institutional structures that shape our
day-to-day existence.298
Advertising operates on a micro level, sinking billions of dollars
yearly into promoting, for example, the desirability, sexiness, and value
of the automobile as a mode of transport, in contexts where competing
voices can draw on only a minuscule fraction of those economic
resources. And it operates on a macro level, emphasizing private
satisfactions over collective action. It suggests that each of us can know
who we are and can achieve respect from others, can solve the problems
of death and loneliness, simply by buying consumer goods: that
exchanging money for physical objects will buy us beauty, success, and
control over our personal circumstances.299
From this perspective, the Court’s concern in MCFL and Austin
about “the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth”300 on
speech markets is unsurprising. Corporate speech expenditures support
a business-friendly government structure, and a consumerist and
market-friendly ideological framework, on a level almost too deep to
evaluate. A statute limiting the ability of a corporation to use its
treasury funds to influence the result of candidate elections does not
seem an implausible response. There’s tremendous reason to be
skeptical, after all, that the cause of truth would be much advanced by a
corporation’s huge negative ad buy late in an election campaign.301
296. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, Advertising: The Magic System, in CULTURE AND
MATERIALISM: SELECTED ESSAYS 173, 184 (2005); see also MICHAEL SCHUDSON,
ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY
209–33 (1984).
297. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Art as a Cultural System, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 94 (1983).
298. Michael Schudson, pointing to the way committed couples say “I love you” to
invoke and reaffirm the deep underpinnings of their relationship, concludes: “Advertising is
capitalism’s way of saying ‘I love you’ to itself.” SCHUDSON, supra note 296, at 232.
299. See id. at 221; WILLIAMS, supra note 296, at 189–90.
300. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986).
301. For an anecdote, see Molly Redden, This GOP Regulator Questioned Energy
Companies—So They Spent Almost $500,000 to Defeat Him, MOTHER JONES (July 15, 2014),
http://m.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/alabama-energy-election-chip-beeker-terry-dunn
[https://perma.cc/VQZ6-SF3Q]. Nearly three quarters of the money spent by non-party
groups in the 2012 congressional elections went to fund attack ads. TOKAJI & STRAUSE,
supra note 283, at 40; see also David A. Graham, The Incredible Negative Spending of Super
(Oct.
15.
2012),
PACs—in
1
Chart,
ATLANTIC
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/the-incredible-negative-spending-of-super-pacs-
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Even less does it promote democracy for Congress members’ votes to be
driven by fear of that ad buy—what Norman Ornstein has called “the
$20 million alien/predator attack on you and your campaign.”302
D. Bellotti and Austin
And yet the “distortion” rationale of Austin was badly in tension
with orthodox First Amendment thinking, and in particular with
Bellotti.303 The Court in Bellotti had rejected justifications that
“‘corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out
other points of view’ or ‘exert an undue influence’ on the electorate”;304
it had found no reason to believe that “corporate advocacy threatened
imminently to undermine democratic processes.”305 The Court in
Bellotti had pointed to Virginia Board in describing restrictions on
corporate speech as paternalistic.306 “[T]he people in our democracy,” it
had explained, “are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and
evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. . . . [I]f there be
any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and
arguments advanced by [corporations], it is a danger contemplated by
the Framers of the First Amendment.”307 That philosophy simply did
not jibe with the Austin Court’s concern that well-funded corporate
speech could be regulated as “unfair” or “distorting.”308
Moreover—as should be clear by now—it was the worldview of
Bellotti, not Austin, that was more deeply founded in classic First
Amendment thinking. Ordinary First Amendment doctrine has at its
heart the idea that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
in-1-chart/263643 [https://perma.cc/K3NE-BS92].
302. This American Life: Take the Money and Run for Office (Public Radio
International radio broadcast Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radioarchives/episode/461/transcript [http://perma.cc/37JX-8DWT]; see also TOKAJI & STRAUSE,
supra note 283, at 71, 76–89 (the fear of such attacks is “one of the most important ways
outside spending affects the legislative process”).
303. The narrow holdings of Bellotti and Austin were not inconsistent. The Bellotti
majority had explicitly noted the possibility of “a danger of real or apparent corruption in
independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections,” 435 U.S. 765, 788
n.26 (1978), and no Justice in that case had suggested that restrictions on corporate speech in
connection with candidate elections would be problematic. Justice Stevens, concurring in
Austin, stressed the “vast difference between lobbying and debating public issues on the one
hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on the other.” Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
304. Austin, 494 U.S at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789).
305. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
306. Id. at 791 n.31.
307. Id. at 791–92 (footnotes omitted).
308. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659–60.
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trade in ideas—that the best [tool] of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”309 In that
notional market, we take it for granted that government will enforce
property rights in communication resources and otherwise support
private ordering under the common law. We see that government role
as both necessary and sufficient to assure a discussion in which members
of the public have the opportunity to speak and to convince others to
adopt their views, and listeners process that speech in a sufficiently
rational manner.310
I suggested a few pages back that that descriptive understanding of
how speech works in American society is not especially accurate.311 But
it is nonetheless central to our First Amendment thought.312 It is at the
root, for example, of Justice Brandeis’s warning that “[i]f there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the process of education, the [proper response to subversive
advocacy] is more speech, not enforced silence.”313 It is exemplified by
Bellotti’s insistence that we must presume people’s ability to fairly and
accurately evaluate the “information and arguments” corporations put
before them.314 And it seems inconsistent with Austin’s concern that
immense aggregations of corporate wealth, unchecked, could dominate
the political process.315
V. CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
How should we understand the Austin Court’s deviation from First
Amendment orthodoxy? For that matter, how should we understand
the apparent anomaly of false advertising law?

309. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
310. See Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1143.
311. See supra pp. 599–601.
312. This viewpoint is not essential to every set of First Amendment justifications. See
Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1141–42. It nonetheless plays a dominant role in First
Amendment philosophy taken as a whole. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7–12 (1989).
313. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
314. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790–92 (1978).
315. One might think that the use of a “market for ideas” metaphor might actually
support government regulation of speech, given our extensive government regulation of the
market for goods. See R.H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for
Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1974); see also Aaron Director, The
Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1964). But mainstream First
Amendment philosophy has never gone down that path.
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Duncan Kennedy and others, forty years ago, suggested that much
of law reflects an opposition between two broad worldviews.316 The first
sees individuals in society as free and autonomous (in all but exceptional
cases); it is rooted in individualism, value subjectivity, a sharp public–
private distinction, and nonpaternalism.317 In doctrinal form, it is often
expressed through rules.318
The other, by contrast, treats some degree of dependence and
constraint as pervasively present in private ordering.319 It is grounded in
altruism and a belief in the communal nature of values; it minimizes the
public–private distinction and makes room for paternalism.320 In
doctrinal form, it is expressed in important part through situationally
sensitive standards and balancing.321
Imagine contract law as an example. Contract law might follow
mainstream freedom of speech philosophy by treating private choices in
the market place as completely autonomous and free. It would
therefore seek to vindicate private choices by enforcing all contracts that
are supported by formal consideration; it would treat duress, fraud, and
unconscionability as arising only in exceptional cases, relevant only in
sharply bounded, supplementary doctrinal areas.322
On the other hand, contract law might adopt the view that elements
of fraud or economic constraint are pervasive, present in greater or
lesser degree in the circumstances leading up to every contract. It might
seek to address those concerns through doctrine-invalidating contracts
whenever the parties seem to have had problematically unequal
bargaining power, or where the contracts simply seem too unfair.323 To
do so, it would have to rely on some form of fact-specific inquiry, asking
“whether one’s trading partners can actually take care of themselves”
instead of “presum[ing] that their formal legal capacity is the same as
actual capacity.”324 That approach wouldn’t treat private contracts as
something presumptively to be shielded from public intrusion; it would

316. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
317. See id. at 1767–71.
318. See id. at 1770.
319. See id. at 1771–74.
320. See id.
321. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 290–95 (1987);
Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1167.
322. Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1168–73.
323. Id. at 1172–73.
324. KELMAN, supra note 321, at 60.
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recognize that existing property entitlements are government
conferred.325
Some scholars have suggested that the two approaches coexist in
American law notwithstanding their fundamental contradiction and that
the former tends to play the dominant role;326 for purposes of this
Article, we might call the first approach the “default” framework.
Certainly that seems to hold true for First Amendment law. The default
framework nicely fits Bellotti and mainstream First Amendment
thought. Bellotti adopts the default position’s assumption of a world of
individual autonomy, in which individuals can participate as individuals
in the marketplace of ideas, self-directedly able to speak and convince
others of their views, unaffected by the skewing or coercive effects of
inequalities of wealth and power in the private sphere. It follows the
default position in its assumption that people react to speech in rational
ways, choosing to adopt one belief rather than another as part of a
willed, chosen reasoning process; it rejects the idea that people’s views
are largely determined by socialization, social position, etc.327 It follows
the default position in its understanding that the only meaningful source
of constraint in the marketplace of ideas is government intervention.328
But the alternative position—rooted in the concern that inequality
of private power and resources undermines citizens’ free interaction—
holds sway to some extent in American law as well. As I once wrote
elsewhere, “[w]e premise much of the modern administrative state on
the recognition that the economic sphere is in important degree marked
by domination and constraint, that government refusal to intervene is
not necessarily empowering.”329 We give a variety of administrative
agencies, such as the FTC, discretion to address that (although lawyers
tend to see it as a problem that administrators exercise discretion rather
than applying hard-edged rules).330
And the alternative position holds sway in some areas of First
Amendment law: I have suggested elsewhere that U.S. broadcast

325. Those, after all, were among the realists’ key insights. See John P. Dawson,
Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 277 (1947); Robert L.
Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); see also
Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 764 (1981) (book
review).
326. See KELMAN, supra note 321, at 290–95; Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1181.
327. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791–92.
328. See id. at 776–86.
329. Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1179.
330. See id. at 1178–79.
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regulation law, in major part, reflects the alternative approach.331 That’s
what underlay the Court’s caution in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
that absent administrative allocation, a few private licensees might
“monopoliz[e]” broadcast discourse, making impossible an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas.332 It’s what underlay the fear that absent a
fairness doctrine, private holders of media power would be able to
exercise “unlimited private censorship.”333
Austin’s concern that inequality of private power and resources may
undermine citizens’ free interaction straightforwardly embraces the
alternative position peeking out from below the surface of our
jurisprudence.334 The law of commercial speech reflects the same
dichotomy.
In other words, commercial speech law, like our corporate speech
precedent, is riven. Both bodies of law display the same themes of
autonomy and constraint, the same split between default and alternative
positions. Recall that the Court’s rationales in Bellotti and Virginia
Board were essentially the same: In thinking about both commercial
advertising and corporate speech, the Court told us that the speech is
protected not for the sake of the self-actualization or the freedom of
conscience of those who utter it but because it provides valuable views
and information to listeners.335 The Court in Sorrell relied on that
thinking to rule that content discrimination in the regulation of
commercial speech is sharply disfavored, as much so as in the politicalspeech context.336
But in commercial speech law as in the law of corporate speech, the
vision of information made available by corporations to all is countered
by competing concerns about exploitation and distortion. When it came
to electoral speech by corporations, Austin provided the counterpoint;
in the law of commercial speech, consumer protection and trademark
law provide the analogous exceptions.
Mainstream First Amendment law’s sharp rhetoric forbidding
paternalism and content discrimination thus falls away once commercial
speech is said to be “misleading”; the law of misleading advertising
straightforwardly reflects the premises of the alternative position.
331. See id. at 1181–89.
332. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
333. Id. at 392.
334. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S 652, 658–60 (1990).
335. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
336. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664–67 (2011).
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Rejecting the myth of the supremely competent auditor, it recognizes
that consumers process speech in ways that may lend themselves to
exploitation by advertisers hoping to mislead and that greater or lesser
degrees of distortion and nonrational thinking are pervasive in the
enterprise of advertising. It adopts a stance of paternalism, protecting
consumers from their own errors. And in order to do so, it relies not on
fact-specific, case-by-case determinations, not on the sort of hard-edged
rules that maximize predictability for speakers. In other words, just as
the philosophy of Bellotti is opposed by the concerns of Austin, the
libertarian philosophy of Sorrell is opposed by our acceptance of an
expansive and paternalistic government role when it comes to
misleading advertising.
Recognizing this dichotomy helps us understand some key points.
First, the fact that Austin’s worldview is necessarily in tension with the
one underlying Bellotti does not mean that either one is wrong. To the
contrary, both are fundamental (if inconsistent) building blocks of U.S.
law, reflecting deeply held intuitions, and both reflect aspects of reality.
Second, I will suggest, the occasional emergence of the alternative
position in American law is what makes dominance of the default
position tolerable. On the one hand, it’s a good thing that the default
position is dominant in First Amendment law. The default position is
properly concerned about self-interested government control of
individuals’ speech. Curbing private power over speech resources
means enhancing public authority, and that means giving government
officials supervisory authority over a segment of public debate. Any
vision of a more active governmental role in supervising the speech
marketplace has to deal with the significant chance that government
action will be incompetent, misguided, arbitrary, or political.337
But the example of consumer protection law suggests that we
cannot, as a practical matter, stick only with the default position. A
speech regulatory system based only on classic free-speech philosophy
underestimates the degree to which concentrations of private power can
skew the reasoning processes of the community. Common experience
tells us that government regulation of misleading advertising is good for
society. Trademark law, as broadly understood today, is good for
society. If ordinary First Amendment thinking tells us otherwise, that’s
an indication that ordinary First Amendment thinking is incomplete. A
complete, and workable, system of free expression will have niches in

337. See Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1195.
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which it will acknowledge the alternative position, and will regulate
accordingly.
VI. CORPORATE SPEECH REDUX
There is one obvious difference between the law of corporate speech
and the law of commercial advertising. In the former—but not the
latter—the Supreme Court recently has acted to eliminate the internal
conflict between default and alternative positions. In Citizens United in
2011, the Court characterized Bellotti and Austin as “conflicting lines of
precedent,”338 and embraced the first to overrule the second.339 It
rejected the possibility that corporate expenditures could distort or
corrupt at all.340 Quite the contrary, the majority said: it is vital to our
society that corporate voices, which “best represent the most significant
segments of the economy,” be able to “reach[] the public and advis[e]
voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”341
When government limits corporations’ ability to speak, out of fear that
massive corporate treasuries will distort the marketplace of ideas, it is
really “control[ling] thought” and eliminating “the freedom to think for
ourselves.”342
The Court built on that foundation in 2014 in deciding McCutcheon
v. FEC.343 That case involved individual rather than corporate
contributions.344 Federal law limited the total amount an individual
could donate in a given election cycle; it sought to address the danger
that large contributors to a party and its candidates would gain undue
influence over the party’s office holders, an influence the statute’s
drafters had seen as “inherently, endemically, and hopelessly
corrupting.”345 But just as the Court in Citizens United rejected the
possibility that corporate speech could be distorting or corrupting, in
McCutcheon it rejected the idea that—absent literal bribery—it was
distorting or corrupting for large contributors to a party to have unusual

338. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 346–48 (2010).
339. Id. at 365.
340. Id. at 348–49.
341. Id. at 354 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
342. Id. at 356.
343. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
344. Id. at 1443.
345. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 481 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Senator
Rudman), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), quoted in McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct.
at 1484 (Appendix A).
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influence over elected officials from that party.346 Quite the contrary—
special influence for those with the means to make large financial
contributions, Chief Justice Roberts explained, is a “central feature of
democracy.”347
Now, that a Supreme Court majority would exalt disproportionate
political access for the wealthy as a “central feature of democracy”348
was not an obvious result. Nor had it been a foregone conclusion that
the Court in Citizens United would sweep away a six-decade-old,
repeatedly reaffirmed, federal statutory regime.349 Both decisions were
5–4, after all,350 and by a margin of one vote could have gone the other
way. But the Citizens United result teaches us that Austin’s position in
the law of corporate speech was fragile in a way that commercial-speech
consumer protection law is not.
A. Speech and Citizenship
Why was that? Let’s go back to Austin, and look more closely.
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, in their separate Austin dissents, stressed
what they saw as a fatal contradiction between Austin’s rule and the
structure of ordinary First Amendment law.351 They pointed out that in
ordinary freedom of speech law, we don’t normally see inequalities in
speech resources as problematic.352 We assume that the marketplace of
346. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1451 (plurality opinion).
347. The full quote, in case the reader figures that the language quoted in text must
have been taken out of context, states:
[G]overnment regulation [of campaign contributions] may not target the general
gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the
political access such support may afford. “Ingratiation and access . . . are not
corruption.” They embody a central feature of democracy—that constituents
support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are
elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.
Id. at 1441 (omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 360 (2010)).
As Usha Rodrigues has shown, the price for an official act inspired by a campaign
contribution can be surprisingly low. See Usha R. Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption 4
(Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law, Research Paper Series No. 2014-23 Aug. 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486720 [http://perma.cc/35R2-67NU].
348. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (plurality opinion).
349. The Court had reaffirmed Austin’s validity as recently as 2003. See McConnell, 540
U.S. 93; see also FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
350. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434.
351. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S 652, 679–80 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 695–96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 680–85, 692–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 704–06 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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ideas is not disabled by the fact that some individuals can devote vastly
more resources to speech than others.353 Indeed, the fact that different
individuals are able to spend completely arbitrary amounts of money on
speech, depending on the resources available to them, is at the heart of
the American system of freedom of speech.354
First Amendment law has never acknowledged anything wrong with
that inequality. On the contrary, our cases say that government is
largely disabled from addressing it.355 “[T]he concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.”356
Any such step, we are told, would constitute
prohibited discrimination against the speech of the wealthy.357 As the
Court has put this argument, perhaps channeling Anatole France, the
First Amendment right to speak cannot “be made to depend on a
person’s financial ability.”358
Michigan campaign finance law, thus, imposed no limitations on the
ability of wealthy individuals to spend their own money on speech
relating to candidate elections:359 if a wealthy individual had wanted to
drop $50 or $60 billion on public information campaigns relating to the
Michigan gubernatorial election, Michigan law saw no reason to stop
him. Moreover, all of the Justices would have agreed, the First
Amendment stripped from Michigan any power to stop him.360
In light of all that, Justices Scalia and Kennedy can be seen to argue,
the Austin majority’s embrace of the alternative position was simply
incoherent: it created a contradiction in campaign finance law that was
too powerful to ignore.361 While a corporation accumulates funds
without regard “to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
353. See supra Part IV.C.
354. See supra Part IV.C.
355. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008) (federal law cannot raise
contribution limits for opponents of candidates spending more than $350,000 of their own
money); see also Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2828–29 (2011) (stating that the state cannot administer matching funds system so as to award
publicly financed candidates the same amount of money spent by or on behalf of their
privately financed opponents).
356. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam).
357. Id. at 49 n.55.
358. Id. at 49; cf. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (New York, The Modern
Library 1917) (1894) (“[T]he majestic equality of the laws . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to
sleep under the bridges . . . .”).
359. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665 (1990).
360. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
361. See Austin, 494 U.S at 665; id. at 682–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ideas,”362 the same is true of wealthy individuals who choose to buy
political advertising. Yet if the distortion is the same whether the
money is coming from Koch Industries or the Koch brothers, what
difference does it make? After all, as the Citizens United majority later
urged, all speakers, whether corporate or individual, “use money
amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech.”363
The Austin majority answered that corporations—unlike
individuals—amass their funds by virtue of a “unique state-conferred
corporate structure.”364 That answer, though, just isn’t satisfying. It
leaves open the question why, exactly, the state-conferred structure
should matter. Is a corporation’s speech, using funds accumulated with
the aid of state corporations law, more distorting than the speech of a
wealthy individual, using funds accumulated with the aid of state
property, contracts, and estates law? After all, nonprofit corporations
also utilize the state-conferred corporate structure, and Justice Marshall
had joined Justice Brennan’s opinion in MCFL holding that concerns
about “the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth” don’t
necessarily apply to nonprofits.365
362. Id. at 660 (majority opinion).
363. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010).
364. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
365. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); see also supra notes 274–
75 and accompanying text.
One important consequence of the corporate structure is that for-profit corporate
managers are using what has notably been described as “other people’s money”—they are
engaging in speech using funds contributed by shareholders, who haven’t authorized the
corporation to spend the money in this way. See Winkler, supra note 258, at 873–74. I think,
though, that this argument has less independent force than initially appears. The argument
offers no basis to challenge corporate managers’ decisions to spend money on advertising or
other speech closely aligned with the core interests of the corporation; we take it for granted
that a corporation can spend money to advance its business interests. That speech has a
profound cultural impact that is on some level equally unintended by the folks whose salary
contributions funded the pension funds that are buying corporate shares. And why, then, is a
corporation’s political speech not equally unproblematic so long as the corporation is
sufficiently clear-eyed about which political outcomes will maximize its profits? Corporate
political speech is commonly intended to advance the firm’s business interests, as when the
corporation seeks to defeat an officeholder whom it believes will be sympathetic to
undesirable regulation. All of this poses, at the very least, a line-drawing challenge to the
claim that certain corporate speech unfairly relies on the contributions of dissenting
stockholders.
Moreover, if we assume that corporate political spending is a frolic undertaken by
managers divergent from the interests of corporate shareholders, see First Nat’l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 813 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (characterizing the challenged
corporate speech expenditures in that case as “promot[ing] . . . the purely personal views of
the management”), can we reconcile that with the alternative argument, see infra notes 400–
02 and accompanying text, that corporate speech is undeserving of First Amendment
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Are there other ways to minimize or mitigate this contradiction?
One possible answer might be that the state-conferred structure allows
for-profit corporations to amass “immense aggregations of wealth” that
can “dominat[e] the political process”366 in a way that a few wealthy
individuals cannot.
That corporations have more and bigger
aggregations of wealth than individuals is undeniable; more than fifty
U.S. corporations have market capitalization larger than the net worth
of Bill Gates (the richest U.S. individual).367 It’s an empirical question,
though, whether individuals or corporations, in the aggregate, are more
motivated to spend their money on influencing candidate elections. So
far the answer seems to be the former. In the 2012 federal election
cycle, the total of the identifiable contributions made by all for-profit
businesses to Super PACs was not quite as much as the contributions of
one couple—Sheldon and Miriam Adelson—individually.368
Alternatively, one might argue that while wealthy individuals may
individually have outsize influence, collectively their views tend to
cancel each other out, lessening their systemic effect on the marketplace
of ideas.369 By contrast, one might argue, for-profit corporations’ unfair
influence tends to push in a single direction, structurally biased towards
capitalism, consumerism, and anti-regulation (except where regulation
generates rents), thus tending to skew and distort the conversation.370
Like the alternative position generally, this argument has the advantage
of being rooted in reality. It will not avail us, though, if we’re looking
for consistency with mainstream First Amendment law. This argument
seems grotesquely un-First-Amendment-y to anyone who learned about
viewpoint discrimination in the basic Constitutional Law course. And
there is still the counterargument that allowing viewpoint-based
government regulation of speech on this theory would be even more
dangerous than letting capital have its say.
protection because it is entirely market determined? And would any of this be a problem but
for our concern that this expenditure of other peoples’ money will skew the marketplace of
ideas? In that sense, I think the “other people’s money” argument collapses into Austin’s
distortion claim.
366. Austin, 494 U.S at 659–60.
367. Compare The Forbes 400, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/forbes400/ [http://perma.cc/KK4E-43GZ] (as of September 29, 2015, Bill Gates was the wealthiest
American with a net worth of $76 billion), with Fin. Times, Financial Times Global 500 (Mar.
31, 2014), http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/7097ad1a-fded-11e3-bd0e-00144feab7de.xls
[https://perma.cc/6HLB-6T6U].
368. See BOWIE & LIOZ, supra note 287, at 1.
369. See id. at 12–13 (urging that this argument is empirically unsupported).
370. See supra Part IV.C.
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Finally, one might answer that for-profit corporations are unlike
wealthy individuals in that they fall outside of our political community.
By definition, one might argue, speech of wealthy individuals reflects
“popular support”371 because wealthy individuals are, after all, people.
By contrast, corporations are not part of the polity; they are exterior to
our circle of citizenship. Thus, the argument continues, law allowing
corporations to amass great wealth and then to use that wealth to
influence candidate elections is law allowing outside forces to influence
our community, working corrosion and distortion of the community’s
discourse.
This claim is worth further exploration because we have so little
difficulty with it in a more straightforward context. Consider the
controversy over foreign spending in U.S. candidate elections that arose
in the wake of Citizens United. Politicians and others raised the
possibility that Citizens United could open the door to foreigners’
seeking to influence U.S. elections—and while opinion may have been
divided on the desirability of corporate spending, hardly anybody
seemed to think foreign spending was a good idea.372
Let’s do a thought experiment: Imagine that the American people
learn that a deep-pocketed foreign actor is planning on spending a huge
amount of money in order to influence U.S. candidate elections. One
can imagine people having two possible reactions. The first possibility:
“This is wonderful news. The money will fund additional advertising
and other forms of speech so that the marketplace of ideas will be richer
and U.S. citizens will be better informed. There is no downside.” The
371. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting MCFL, 479, U.S. 238, 258 (1986)).
372. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 424 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (majority’s approach “would appear to afford the same
protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual
Americans”); President Barrack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address [https://pe
rma.cc/D729-SNNF] (“[Citizens United] will open the floodgates for special interests—
including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.”); Dan Eggen & Ben
Pershing, Campaign Finance Ruling Leaves Democrats with Few Options, WASH. POST (Jan.
23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/22/AR20100122048
11.html [https://perma.cc/3NET-NJMA] (quoting Democratic Rep. Chris Van Hollen as
asking: “Do you really want the Chinese or any other country to be able to spend money on
our elections?”); see also John Hudson, Feds: Mexican Tycoon Exploited Super PACs to
Influence U.S. Elections, FP: CABLE (Feb. 11, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/11/fedsmexican-tycoon-exploited-super-pacs-to-influence-u-s-elections/
[https://perma.cc/NY478JQN]. But see Brief of Amici Curiae the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee
Rights and the National Immigrant Justice Center in Support of Appellants, Bluman v. FEC,
132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (No. 11-275), http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/bluman_sc_icirr_nijc_am
icus_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QTL-DTZY].
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second: “This is problematic, because the outcome of the election will
be shifted in the direction desired by some entity not part of the U.S.
political community, with interests perhaps adverse to that of the
community as a whole.” The logic of Citizens United suggests the first
reaction,373 but the intuitive reaction of most people would be the
second. And indeed, it’s the second position that’s reflected in U.S.
law.374
United States statutory law forbids any person who is not a U.S.
citizen (or a lawful permanent resident while in the United States) to
spend money to make “electioneering communications”375—that is,
those messages advocating the election or defeat of a political candidate,
disseminated via broadcast, cable, or satellite immediately before an
election, that the Citizens United Court held were within the sphere of
protected corporate speech.376 The courts have upheld the restriction;
the U.S. government, we are told, has a compelling interest in “limiting
the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American democratic
self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the
U.S. political process.”377
That holding—by a three-judge district court in Bluman v. FEC378
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court379—rests on two, perhaps
three, foundations. The first is that well-targeted expenditures on
speech can indeed affect public debate in ways inconsistent with the
marketplace metaphor—otherwise, concern about foreign influence
would make no sense.380 The second is a refusal to credit the view that
“more speech is always better” when the additional speech originates
from sources outside “the community’s process of political selfdefinition.”381 The third, perhaps, is a premise that speech and
expenditures closely tied to candidate elections can be more easily
regulated than speech in general.382

373. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
374. 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (Supp. 2015) (previously classified as 2 U.S.C. § 441(e)).
375. Id.
376. See supra pp. 586–87.
377. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge panel), aff’d
mem., 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
378. Id.
379. Bluman, 132 S. Ct. 1087.
380. See Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288–90.
381. See id. at 287 (quoting Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982)).
382. See id. at 290–92.
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Could this reasoning apply to corporations’ political speech? The
Bluman court, anticipating the question, said no.383
“American
corporations,” it explained, “are all members of the American political
community.”384 And that is the issue, if the Austin concern for corporate
distortion is not to pose a recalcitrant contradiction with other elements
of First Amendment law. Do we see for-profit corporations as Austin
sees them, as artificial legal entities that sit atop immense aggregations
of wealth, but whose political ideas are uncorrelated with those of “the
public”?385 Or do we see them as Citizens United sees them, as
“associations of citizens”386 that “represent the most significant segments
of the economy”?387 Opposed to Justice Stevens’ insistence that
corporations “are not themselves members of ‘We the People’”388 we
have Justice Roberts’s recognition of the commonplace that
“[c]orporate executives and employees counsel Members of Congress
and Presidential administrations on many issues, as a matter of
routine.”389
Part of the challenge here is that the lines of the human discursive
and political community do not neatly track the rules of corporate
organization. Towards the beginning of Part IV, I suggested a
distinction between closely held corporations (defined by the IRS to
include those where a majority of the stock is held by five or fewer
people)390 and publicly held corporations marked by a greater
separation of ownership and control.391 A small for-profit corporation
(say, a law firm) might look a lot like a true ideological association.392

383. Id. at 290.
384. Id.
385. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
386. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010).
387. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
388. Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
389. Id. at 355 (majority opinion). This brings back to mind the question I had earlier
dismissed as not useful: whether we should think of corporations as “persons.” See supra Part
IV.A.
390. More accurately, the category of corporations described in text includes both
“closely held” corporations and “personal service” corporations, for which the corporation’s
principal activity is providing personal services in specified fields, and where a substantial part
of the services are provided by employee-owners. See IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB.
542,
CORPORATIONS
2–3
(2012),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p542.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HQG-42TA].
391. See supra pp. 586–89.
392. This is all the more true for “benefit corporations,” for-profit entities organized in
part to serve public-interest goals. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–68 (2016).
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Its speech might well be appropriately seen as analogous to the
associational speech of nonprofit corporations formed and funded by
individuals. But the distinction is imperfect. The category of closely
held corporations includes some—like food, agriculture, financial, and
industrial products and services provider Cargill, with more than $120
billion in revenue and 153,000 employees393—which more nearly seem to
present the problems Austin raised.394 Nor does the distinction between
individuals, closely held corporations, and other corporations exhaust
the possibilities for categorization—where, under this approach, would
one slot LLCs, say, or limited partnerships?
Alternatively, even large for-profit corporations can sometimes look
at least a little like human ideological communities. Google is a large
for-profit corporation, but its public policy positions—such as its
opposition to the SOPA bill395—plausibly reflect the views of many
Google employees. And while some have suggested that corporations’
speech lies outside our human discourse because it is instrumental and
market determined,396 human individuals too (sometimes) speak
instrumentally and in the cause of profit. So the lines are hard to draw.
And that makes sense: as I indicated in Part V, once legal decisionmakers begin treating limitations on individual autonomy as pervasive
rather than exceptional, then hard-edged rules become problematic.
One needs to turn to fuzzier, situationally sensitive standards.397
B. The Limits of Austin
There is a different reason, moreover, to view Austin as fragile.
Recall that notwithstanding the challenges detailed in the previous
section, the principles of Austin were the law for sixty-four years.398 And
yet Austin never had any applicability outside the narrow context of

393. America’s
Best
Employer’s
#133
Cargill,
FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/companies/cargill/ [http://perma.cc/ZE7U-WVAW] (last visited Apr.
1, 2016).
394. See Stephanie Armour & Rachel Feintzeig, Ruling Raises Question: What Does
‘Closely Held’ Mean?, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2014, at A6, http://online.wsj.com/articles/hobbylobby-ruling-begs-question-what-does-closely-held-mean-1404154577 [https://perma.cc/6FKM
-RRKS].
395. See David Drummond, Don’t Censor the Web, GOOGLE: PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Jan.
18,
2012),
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2012/01/dont-censor-web.html
[https://perma.cc/J7QQ-54M6].
396. See Baker, supra note 232, at 1177.
397. See Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1175.
398. I am counting from the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 to Citizens
United. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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candidate elections.399 Why? The answer: Austin was workable only
when confined to that narrow corner.
It is not that one cannot imagine extending Austin more broadly.
The late Ed Baker, using reasoning parallel to that later found in
Bluman, argued that commercial speech, and the speech of for-profit
corporations, should enjoy no First Amendment protection at all.400
Corporate speech, he argued, does not stem from a human discursive
community.401 It is driven by market needs rather than by individuals’
feelings or desires.402 Our political community is limited to natural
persons, he continued, and we as a people can choose to keep the
conversation within our own community.403 But a little thought makes
clear the deep problems inherent in seeking to extend the approach of
Austin to the world of speech at large.
Recall Bellotti’s starting point, that it is imperative to protect
corporations’ speech because that speech provides information that
educates the public and informs the political process.404 That argument
is uncontroversial when it comes to the mass media; even folks who are
most concerned about corporate skew wouldn’t want to strip First
Amendment protections from the institutional press.405 But a lot of
entities that perform mass media functions are owned by corporations.406
So can we, following Austin, adequately distinguish between (good)
corporate media, protected because of their informing role, from other
(bad) corporate entities, entitled to less protection because of the
dangers of distortion?
The exercise I’m proposing here is a simple line-drawing exercise—
but I want to emphasize how problematic that line drawing would be.
The Supreme Court, over the years, has uncontroversially recognized
free speech rights in a wide range of media corporations broadly
construed—newspapers and broadcasters407 but also movie
distributors,408 theatrical producers,409 book publishers,410 even bars that
399. See Richard H. Pildes, Elections as a Distinct Sphere Under the First Amendment, in
MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 19 (Monica Youn
ed., 2011).
400. See Baker, supra note 232, at 1187.
401. See id. at 1182–83.
402. See id. at 1177.
403. See id. at 1183.
404. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1977); see also supra Part IV.
405. See id. at 808 & n.8 (White, J., dissenting).
406. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964).
407. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
408. See, e.g., Kingley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 690
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feature live entertainment.411 Federal campaign finance law, preCitizens United, addressed this via a statutory exemption intended to
protect “the unfettered right of the newspapers, TV networks, and other
media to cover and comment on political campaigns.”412 But outside the
realm of candidate elections, where would we draw the line to define
those corporate entities whose speech advances First Amendment goals
in a way outweighing any dangers of distortion?
Some have suggested that we can solve this problem simply by
protecting the “press.”413 But it would not do to protect only entities
engaged in news gathering.414 That would leave corporate-owned movie
studios, theatrical producers, and entertainment venues without First
Amendment protection, and few would think that a good result.
One might imagine, again drawing on intuitive understandings of the
“press,” that corporate entities should gain First Amendment protection
only when disseminating speech to the public as an end rather than a
means. The idea would be to distinguish the public relations firm,
seeking to manage the news, from a newspaper seeking to report it.415
But that doesn’t give us a coherent or workable test; members of the
press typically disseminate speech as a means to the end of selling ads
(1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
409. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1975).
410. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 123 (1991).
411. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932–34 (1975).
412. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1239, at 4 (1974).
413. See E-mail from Roslyn Litman to the author (Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with author).
414. The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), thus, defines the “news media”
to include entities that gather information “about current events or that would be of current
interest to the public,” “turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distribute[] that work
to an audience.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2012); see also Cause of Action v. FTC, 961 F.
Supp. 2d 142, 161–64 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating that an organization is not news media for FOIA
purposes unless it can “disseminate the requested information to the public rather than
merely make it available” and “its operational activities are especially organized around
doing so”). State shield laws undertake the same sort of inquiry. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-21a (2011) (defining “news media” to include “newspapers, magazines, press
associations, news agencies, [and] wire services,” with each of those terms separately defined,
as well as radio, television, and “other similar printed, photographic, mechanical or electronic
means of disseminating news to the general public”). That statute at one point circularly
defines “news” to include any information disseminated by news media, id. § 2A:84A-21a(b),
but the definitions elsewhere treat it as having independent meaning, see, e.g., id. § 2A:84A21a(c) (defining “newspaper” as “a paper that is printed and distributed ordinarily not less
frequently than once a week and that contains news, articles of opinion, editorials, features,
advertising, or other matter regarded as of current interest, has a paid circulation and has
been entered at a United States post office as second class matter”).
415. See In re Napp Tech. Litig., 768 A.2d 274, 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000)
(denying state shield law protection to a public relations firm on essentially this ground).
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and making money.416 One might argue that an entity should enjoy
protection as “press” if it controls its own means of distribution, as
newspapers and magazines do, rather than merely soliciting or
purchasing from others a route to the public’s eyeballs. But Internetmediated communication makes a hash of that approach: any entity can
put up a website directly accessible to the public.417
One might say that a for-profit corporate entity is “the press” and
entitled to protection if and only if it is engaged in the business of selling
speech to the public for money. This would include the New York
Times, and exclude political advertising, including the speech centrally
at issue in the Citizens United case (a video called Hillary: The Movie
that the maker sought to make available, via cable-system video-ondemand, at no charge to viewers).418 The idea would be that media
corporations distribute speech the public wants and is willing to pay for,
while speech that a corporation distributes without market constraint
should be seen as just an attempt to manipulate the discourse.
Unsurprisingly, that still doesn’t work. If Hillary: The Movie had
been offered for a peppercorn, should its status then have been
different? And what about NBC News, which is available for free to
anyone with a broadcast antenna? The Washington Times, a nominally
for-profit entity that has lost money every year it has been in
existence?419 The owners of the Washington Times, in a very real sense,
have paid to distribute its speech to the public; but characterizing it on
that basis as not “the press” would be odd. A little earlier, I mentioned
the claim that corporations’ speech should be deemed to lie outside our
human discourse because it is instrumental and market determined;420
this approach seems to say, contradictorily, that speech is market
determined only if it is not sold in the marketplace.

416. Nor would it work to make frequency of publication the test. See, e.g., In re
Burnett, 635 A.2d 1019, 1020–21, 1024 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1993) (holding that a once-ayear report rating the financial condition of insurance companies was “news media” within
the meaning of New Jersey’s shield law).
417. Cause of Action v. FTC, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 163, suggested that whether an
organization with a website was “news media” for FOIA purposes should depend on how
popular the website is. While this might work for FOIA purposes, it seems deeply
problematic from a First Amendment perspective.
418. The maker proposed to pay $1.2 million for the use of those facilities. Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010).
419. Jennifer Harper, Washington Times Reaches Profitability After 33 Years, $1 Billion
in Losses, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/14/
washington-times-reaches-profitability-after-33-ye/print/ [https://perma.cc/UQ92-8M3X].
420. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
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One might say that the corporate speech deserving fullest protection
is speech that in some meaningful sense is really the speech of the
human beings who created it—notwithstanding that those individuals
were working within, or connected via contracts to, a corporate entity.
That approach would give more First Amendment protection to a book
written by J.K. Rowling and published by Little Brown than to an essay
on corporate responsibility published with no individual by-line by GM;
the idea would be that the former was more nearly an expression of
individual authorship.
Yet there are individuals behind GM’s speech as much as there are
individuals behind a publisher’s books. Some Don Draper writes those
messages from GM—whether commercial or political—and he utilizes
creativity and artistry in doing so. The argument would have to be that
Don’s human authorship on behalf of GM doesn’t count because he is
only acting within an economically determined role. But then how do
we treat the corporation-owned bar that plays live music? The bar
musician is also acting within an economically determined role.
Should our criterion then be whether the individual speaker (whose
speech is being coordinated or distributed by the corporation) has
meaningful autonomy about what messages she sends? It does not seem
at all satisfying to say that when a corporation owns a restaurant, and
hires a musician, then whether the First Amendment applies depends on
how closely it restricts her set list. Nor can we say that it’s not “media”
if a corporation is coordinating or distributing speech only in service of
its own economic interests because, well, all media companies do that.
All this may seem like an exercise in the obvious. My larger point,
though, is that Austin-style campaign finance regulation—an approach
that proved workable enough in practice for the sixty-odd years it was in
place—only worked because it was limited to speech in a particular
narrow context carrying a sharply constrained set of messages. Its
distinction between distorting and informative corporate speech would
have been incoherent in a broader setting.421

421. Along similar lines, see Michael McConnell’s argument that the FECA was
unconstitutional—and Citizens United rightly decided—because the distinction between
protected corporate media and unprotected non-media was unworkable even within the
narrow elections context. See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a
Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 438 (2013) (stating that FECA could be upheld only if
First Amendment press protections could be confined to “the journalism profession”—but
“[t]here is no coherent way to distinguish the institutional press from others who disseminate
information and opinion to the public through communications media”).
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Nor would it have made sense to transplant Austin to a broader
setting in any event. Recall that corporations’ spending on political
speech directed to the public is dwarfed by their spending on non-public
speech directed at government officials (i.e., lobbying).422 The Court has
given corporate spending on lobbying a warm constitutional embrace.
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
the Court referred to the legislative lobbying activities of two dozen
railroads, their trade association, and their public relations firm as just
an example of “the people . . . freely inform[ing] the government of their
wishes,” implicating the constitutional right of petition.423 There was no
suggestion there that corporations were somehow outside the American
political community—quite the contrary, from the perspective of Justice
Black’s opinion, railroad corporations were the people.424 Yet any
serious attempt to address the concerns of Austin in the larger political
sphere would be better addressed to lobbying than to political
advertising.
Indeed, such an attempt would have to take into account corporate
charity as well. Consider the fast-food restaurant chain Chick-fil-A.
The company provides essentially all of the funding of the charitable
WinShape Foundation, giving it more than $22 million in 2011 alone.425
WinShape in turn engages in a variety of speech activities, and has
funded other groups that engage in speech activities (in particular, in
2011, it passed along nearly $3 million to the Marriage and Family
Foundation, an entity created to support “public awareness campaigns”
relating to marriage and sexual morality).426 Any attempt to purge the
422. See supra pp. 600–03.
423. 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961).
424. The Court in Noerr rooted its ultimate holding—that legislative lobbying could not
be the basis for antitrust liability—in statutory construction rather than in the Constitution.
Id. at 135–45. However, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972), in which plaintiffs sought antitrust liability for defendant trucking corporations’
aggressive institution of administrative and judicial proceedings against them, the Court
shifted to a constitutional basis. It held that “groups with common interests,” such as the
defendants, had First Amendment rights of association and petition, precluding liability so
long as their litigation was not a “sham.” Id. at 510–11.
425. I am aggregating a $7.7 million dollar contribution from Chick-fil-A and a $14.7
million dollar contribution from its sister corporation CFA Properties. See Winshape
Foundation, Inc., Form 990-PF: Return of Private Foundation, at sched. B pt. I (2011),
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990pf_pdf_archive/581/581595471/581595471_201112_990PF.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7A5H-GBRQ]. WinShape was formed in 1982 by Chick-fil-A’s founder
S. Truett Cathy.
426. See id. at pt. 6; Lucas Grindley, A Big Loophole? Chick-fil-A Is Already Raising
Questionable Money, ADVOCATE (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.advocate.com/business/2012/09
/20/chick-fil-raising-money-very-week-anti-marriage-equality-group [https://perma.cc/RC8T-
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public debate of speech funded, directly or indirectly, by for-profit
corporations would have to sweep very widely indeed.427 Such moves
would neither be plausible nor consistent with our constitutional
tradition.
VII.COMMERCIAL SPEECH REDUX
We saw in the previous part that—while tension between default and
alternative viewpoints is inevitable—it’s especially hard for election law
to incorporate both Austin’s understanding of corporate speech and the
default position’s acceptance of the huge speech advantages given to
wealthy individuals.428 Making that work rests on the proposition that
corporations fall outside the American circle of citizenship, a circle
containing only human persons. But that proposition requires difficult
line drawing and contested assumptions.
Moreover, drawing the boundaries of Austin is made more
challenging by the fact that so much of the valuable information and
viewpoints in our society is made available to the public by
corporations—and any attendant distortion is so ingrained in the fabric
of our society that we cannot really address it. Finally, limitations on
corporate political speech risk irrelevance given the other multiple
avenues of corporate influence on society, whether through commercial
speech, lobbying of legislators and administrators, or contributions to
other entities engaged in political and speech activity.
When we turn our attention to commercial speech, on the other
hand, the alternative position seems to have no such fragility. In part,
the alternative position is more secure in this context because
commercial speech as a class does not seem to have much First
Amendment value; that’s why the Court did not imagine that it was
protected at all until the 1970s.429
Commercial speech addresses such matters as which shampoo to
buy, not whether to re-elect a political incumbent. It may well, as
Justice Blackmun stated, promote the efficient working of economic
markets—markets work best when consumers have more information
9YAP]. The Marriage and Family Foundation, like Winshape, was founded by a member of
the Cathy family, which owns Chick-fil-A.
427. Charitable contributions by for-profit corporations, in addition, can help buy
political support from nonprofits for the company’s positions. See, e.g., Eliza Krigman,
(June
10,
2011),
AT&T
Gave
Cash
to
Merger
Backers,
POLITICO
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/56660.html [https://perma.cc/F4SY-4K3X].
428. See supra Part VI.
429. See supra Part II.
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and advertising can convey that information.430 But how to structure
markets is a matter for democratic determination; the potential value of
commercial advertising in helping those markets doesn’t support using
the First Amendment to override those democratic judgments.431 The
key First Amendment principle behind a rule disapproving government
restriction of commercial advertising is our suspicion of selective
government censorship. But it’s a contestable empirical question
whether, in the realm of advertising,432 government power or private
power poses the greater threat.433
Line-drawing problems, moreover, are less problematic in the
commercial speech context than they are in the larger context of all
corporate speech. While it may be problematic to say whether a
particular instance of speech should be classed as “commercial,”434 those
problems are insignificant compared to the challenge of classifying
disfavored speech that we encountered in the previous section.
In the context of corporate speech, finally, we saw a limitation to
regulatory effectiveness in that a corporation debarred from engaging in
political speech outside of the elections context could always make its
points in other ways, including shifting its resources to nonprofit
organizations.435 In the commercial speech context, by contrast, a
shampoo company is likely to have little success in shifting resources to
an appreciative nonprofit so that the latter can engage in speech urging
the public to buy its benefactor’s shampoo.
430. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763–65 (1976).
431. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
432. It is relevant here that the informational value of much advertising (especially
television advertising) is low. See Avery M. Abernethy & George R. Franke, The
Information Content of Advertising: A Meta-Analysis, 25 J. ADVERT. 1, 11 (1996). The
foundational analysis is Alan Resnik & Bruce L. Stern, An Analysis of Information Content in
Television Advertising, 41 J. MARKETING 50 (1977).
433. The dangers of government power in the misleading-advertising and trademark
contexts, to be sure, are not nonexistent. See, e.g., supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text;
see also S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). And there
have been politically fraught instances where firms have sought to use commercial speech
regulation to gain an advantage in the marketplace. See, e.g., supra notes 105–07 and
accompanying text. But the alternative position is consistent with the conclusion that
nonetheless the greater evils are those averted by regulation.
434. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 254 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S.
654 (2003).
435. See supra p. 623. In the pre-Citizens United electioneering context, nonprofit
corporations that had received funds from for-profit corporations were themselves subject to
FECA electioneering limitations. See supra note 198. But such restrictions would not be
plausible in the extended version of Austin imagined in the previous part of this Article.
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In short, the alternative position seems pretty robust in the context
of commercial speech. But this discussion raises the question whether
alternative concerns should be dominant—as they are under current
law—only when commercial speech is said to be “misleading.” I urged
earlier that the alternative position is a legitimate countertradition
within American law and, indeed, a necessary one.436 So we must
choose where it has sway and where it does not; and when it comes to
commercial speech, it’s worth examining whether the line the Supreme
Court has drawn is the right one.
To think about that, let’s look at the case of Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Mitchell.437
That pre-Virginia Board case addressed the
constitutionality of federal law banning cigarette advertising from radio
and television.438 The three-judge district court had little difficulty
upholding the statute, citing the subordinate First Amendment status of
product advertising,439 and the Supreme Court affirmed.440
It is impossible to justify that result under current doctrine. In
Virginia Board, the Court distinguished Capital Broadcasting in a
footnote, waving its hands at “the special problems of the electronic
broadcast media.”441 That was all very well for 1972, when we treated
broadcasters as subject to entirely separate First Amendment rules, but
it does not hold up today.
In 1972, one could argue that a broadcaster’s carriage of cigarette
advertising was sanctionable because it disserved the Communications
Act’s “public interest” standard.442 Indeed, one could plausibly argue
then that the Communications Act gave the government wide leeway to
ban all sorts of content-defined categories of speech from the airways.443
436. See supra Part V.
437. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d mem. sub nom., Capital Broad. Co. v. Acting
Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
438. Capital Broad., 333 F. Supp. at 584.
439. Id. at 583.
440. Capital Broad., 405 U.S. 1000.
441. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
773 (1976).
442. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (c) (2012).
443. See Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
221, 250–57 (1996); cf. Monroe Commc’ns Corp. v. FCC, 900 F.2d 351, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(stating that “obscene broadcasts . . . bear on the public interest” and, therefore, FCC license
renewal proceeding must take up allegations that the licensee had aired obscene movies as
scrambled subscription programming); Yale Broad. Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 603–05 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (stating that a broadcaster’s playing songs said to promote illegal drug use may be
inconsistent with its public interest obligations), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973). But see,
e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 177–
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But the Supreme Court never endorsed such an approach, and would
not do so today. To be sure, the Court has applied an intermediatescrutiny standard to some content-based restrictions of broadcast
speech, upholding them if they are adequately well tailored to
promoting “the public’s ‘paramount right’ to be fully and broadly
informed on matters of public importance” in the broadcast context.444
But it has done so only in limited contexts pertaining to structural
considerations such as the fairness doctrine or broadcast diversity—not
as a means of suppressing disfavored views.445 When the Court postVirginia Board considered cases presenting restrictions on commercial
speech in the broadcast medium, it did not suggest that the standard of
scrutiny in these cases was any lower than in the nonbroadcast
context.446
And without a special rule for broadcasting, the Capital
Broadcasting result is badly out of sync with modern law. In Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court considered a Massachusetts law
banning any smokeless tobacco or cigar advertising within 1,000 feet of a
playground.447 It recognized that the restriction would legitimately and
directly further the state’s goal of discouraging use of those products by
minors but nonetheless found it too sweeping, especially given that
“tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest in conveying
truthful information about their products to adults, and adults have a
corresponding interest in receiving truthful information about tobacco
products.”448 Given that result, it is hard to imagine how the federal
broadcast ban—which contains no exceptions, say, for late-night hours
when children are likely to be in bed—could survive a challenge.449

82 (1987) (excoriating the Yale Broadcasting decision).
444. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 398–99 (1984).
445. See Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). The Ninth Circuit recently applied this
intermediate standard in upholding the statutory plan setting aside broadcast frequencies for
“noncommercial educational” licensees who promise to run educational programming and
are forbidden to accept paid advertisements. Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 736
F.3d 1192, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2874 (2014).
446. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999);
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
447. 533 U.S. 525, 535 (2001). The Massachusetts law also restricted advertising of
cigarettes; the Court found those provisions to be preempted by federal law. Id. at 570–71.
448. Id. at 564.
449. Cf. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(striking down a 24-hour-a-day ban on broadcast indecency on the ground that it was not well
tailored to the goal of protecting children), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 914 (1992).
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Certainly the Court in Lorillard appeared to see no legitimate state
interest in restricting cigarette advertising to adults.450
But should we therefore conclude that Capital Broadcasting was
wrongly decided? I find myself unable to see much good in a body of
First Amendment law that would foreclose the right of the people,
through their democratic representatives, to decide that they do not
want broadcast advertising of cigarettes.451 The evidence of a link
between advertising and tobacco use is strong,452 and the cost in dollars
and lives is tremendous. From the standpoint of Justice Blackmun’s
concern for efficient working of the economic marketplace,453 the
informational value of cigarette advertising on television is trivial. Try
as I might, I find it hard to imagine disqualifying First Amendment
damage being done there. (Indeed, from the perspective of the
alternative position, we might note the historic success of the tobacco
industry in suppressing editorial discussion of the health risks of
smoking in magazines dependent on cigarette advertising and ask about
the First Amendment damage thus done by allowing cigarette
advertising.454)
Or consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.455 This was a pre-Virginia
Board case upholding a rule forbidding a newspaper from including
columns labeled “Jobs-Male Interest” and “Jobs-Female Interest” in its
help wanted ads.456 The Court later characterized Pittsburgh Press as
unproblematic from a First Amendment standpoint because “the
450. See Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Worcester, 851 F. Supp. 2d 311,
319 (D. Mass. 2012) (finding that Sorrell forecloses such a justification).
451. The story behind this particular statutory provision is complicated. Prior to the
statute’s enactment, the FCC had interpreted the fairness doctrine to require broadcasters
carrying cigarette advertising to provide a significant amount of broadcast time to antismoking public service announcements. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). “[T]he individual tobacco companies could not stop
advertising for fear of losing their competitive position; yet for every dollar they spent to
advance their product, they forced the airing of more anti-smoking advertisements and hence
lost more customers.” Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 588 (D.D.C. 1971)
(Skelly Wright, J., dissenting), aff’d mem., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). The tobacco industry
supported the statutory advertising ban to address that dilemma. Id. at 588–89. Today, of
course, with the fairness doctrine long since repealed and generally understood to be
unconstitutional, that dilemma would not exist.
452. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 557–61.
453. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762–63 (1976).
454. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 86.
455. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
456. Id. at 379.
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transactions proposed in the forbidden advertisements [were]
themselves illegal.”457 It relied on the fact that a city ordinance forbade
gender discrimination in hiring.458
But it’s trickier than that. The newspaper pages stated that
employers would consider both men and women for any job except as
explicitly noted in a specific advertisement and warned that gender
discrimination in employment was illegal.459 The newspaper took the
apparently sincere position that it was listing the jobs separately for the
convenience of its readers, so that male readers would not have to waste
their time wading through ads for girly jobs that would only interest
women and female readers would not waste their own time looking at
ads for butch boyish jobs that could not possibly interest them.460 To
that end, even if an employer did not specify in which column its ad
should be run, the newspaper would go back and ask, so as to know
where to file it.461
It seems plain, especially from the perspective of forty years later,
that the newspaper’s attitude was retrograde, pernicious, and actively
harmful. It is hard to argue that in this commercial-speech context a
government rule that want ad columns should not be gender identified
surpassed First Amendment bounds. But the justification that the
columns amounted to advertisement of illegal transactions—as if the
columns were labeled “Narcotics for Sale”—does not quite do it. The
two cases are not parallel. It would be illegal for the company that
placed such an ad to sell narcotics, but it was not illegal for an employer
to hire a person responding to one of its employment ads.
Rather, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that—as in Capital
Broadcasting—the Court was applying a standard of scrutiny for state
regulation of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech that was more
forgiving than ordinary First Amendment doctrine calls for. Further, I
would argue, its decision to do so was appropriate. The Justices
validated that approach a few years later in Central Hudson, explaining
that content-based regulation of even truthful, nonmisleading
advertising was fine so long as it directly and parsimoniously advanced
some “substantial” government interest.462
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
(1980).

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772.
See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388–89.
Id. at 381 n.7.
Id.
Id. at 380 n.5.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 568–69
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In the Sorrell case, the Court discarded the Central Hudson rule,
denying the existence of any more forgiving standard for the regulation
of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech.463 But Sorrell’s context
provides no compelling support for that change. And absent such
support, it’s unclear why we would want the First Amendment to be a
guarantor of pharmaceutical companies’ ability to tailor sales pitches
and gift inducements individually for each doctor in a state so that the
companies can more successfully use targeted techniques in aid of
prodding the doctors to overprescribe proprietary drugs at the expense
of generics.
Once we recognize the interplay between classic First Amendment
thinking and the alternative perspective in the law of commercial
speech, rather, we should recognize that we have a choice between
them. I would argue that the more regulation-friendly rule of Central
Hudson found a better balance than the Court found in Sorrell. In
recent years, the Court has moved away from the alternative position in
both corporate speech and commercial speech law. That has achieved
some ideological consistency. But it may not have made us better off.
VIII.CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s divided commercial speech jurisprudence
combines comfort with regulation of misleading commercial speech,
with a growing hostility to content regulation of commercial advertising
on any ground other than that it is false and misleading, in a way that
seems hard to justify. We can understand that divide better when we
look at the law made by the Court regarding speech by corporations
generally. Those cases are driven by a parallel set of considerations and
display a parallel internal contradiction. In the corporate speech
context, the Supreme Court has recently moved decisively to uphold
traditional free speech philosophy at the expense of the alternative,
more pro-regulatory, worldview. In the commercial speech context,
there is nonetheless a good argument for resting the law on an
alternative set of foundations—recognizing the ubiquity of distortion
and nonrational thinking, leaving room for paternalism, and relying on
fact-specific determinations—notwithstanding that those thoughts are
disfavored in ordinary First Amendment philosophy.

463. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671–72 (2011).

